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Abstract:
This paper examined the presence and scope of mental accounting biases for peerto-peer digital-payment systems (Venmo, PayPal, and Zelle) that have gained popularity
in recent years. Payment mechanism related biases have implications for both consumers
and retailers. The experimental study in this paper looked at different aspects of biases
including how participants evaluate and account for money transferred through peer-topeer digital-payment, if participants treat this money as completely fungible, and if
treatment of this money is affected by demographic variables. Participants in the study
were split into two treatments that differed only in regard to the account (peer-to-peer
versus checking account) to which a $375 windfall was sent. Participants were then asked
to select a payment mechanism for a series of common scenarios. Participants who
received their windfall via a transfer to their peer-to-peer account were significantly more
likely to make payments via the peer-to-peer payment mechanism and spent significantly
more on tips and donations than the participants who received their windfall via a deposit
to their checking account. These results indicate that use of peer-to-peer digital-payment
systems can lead to mental accounting biases, namely increased consumption and
spending.
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I.

Intro

“It’s like monopoly money! If the money is sitting there in the account balance, I spend it
without even thinking about it. Dinners are free. Drinks are free. This shirt I am wearing
right now, this was free”! – a Claremont McKenna Economics Major
“Every month I set up budgets for what I want to spend on groceries, dining out, and
even splurge items. I set up these budgets with respect to the money I am expecting to
make as income and the money I have in my bank accounts. However, these budgets go
completely out the window when I spend money using Venmo or PayPal. Generally, this
is “no big deal” because the money I spend comes from the balance I have in the app but
I frequently forget that I can spend more money than this balance because the app is
linked to my card. My Venmo balance is probably the biggest obstacle to any budgeting I
do”. - a Stanford MBA
“Money stored in Venmo isn’t real. Purchases I make through Venmo barely register as
expenses and the items I buy seem free. If I use Venmo to buy something, it is as if
nothing changes. The number in my bank account (checking account) doesn’t change.
The thickness of my wallet doesn’t change. All that changes is that I got to buy and enjoy
something without having to think about the costs. I know I could transfer the money
from the app to my bank, but it seems just as easy to leave it in the app for “a rainy
day””. – a UCLA Economics Graduate and Investment Banker
Mental accounting refers to the processes by which an individual differentiates
and allocates scarce resources. The term is most frequently used to describe how
consumers budget in order to make choices between spending and saving (and what to
spend on given available funds). Mental accounting can take various forms, ranging from
physical separation of funds into different budgets (ex: cash placed into jars labelled
“rent” or “groceries”) to separation of funds into different accounts (ex: checking account
or savings account) to how an individual views an increase in available funds (ex: $100
found on the street versus $100 in stock dividends). These processes are often rough and
represent an individual’s attempt at self-control in balancing their immediate desire for
consumption with their need to save for the future. Consequently, mental accounting
biases frequently lead to predictable behavioral oddities that stem from a constant
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updating of preferences (spend or save) and circumstances (available resources and
situational needs). One such bias-based oddity is the effect that payment mechanism
selection has on consumption habits.
The modernization and innovation of payment mechanisms has made it
increasingly easy to make payments and transfers. Consumers are no longer hamstrung
by a need to carry cash, write checks, or even pull a credit or debit card out of their
wallet. However, with all of their ease and accessibility, modern payment mechanisms
such as peer-to-peer digital-payment systems are not without their potential pitfalls. As
evidenced by the three anecdotes above, these systems can lead users to circumvent their
own pre-established self-control processes, in turn increasing consumption rates and
changing consumption habits. Of course, such changes in consumption would not be seen
as an issue in the eyes of standard economic theory as it is simply an individual reacting
to changes in resources and subsequently making decisions to maximize their utility.
However, this view is myopic in that it assumes individuals are constantly updating their
inputs and making the requisite calculations to solve the maximization problem. The
quotes above, from three individuals who are well versed in economic theory, offer some
evidence that this is simply not the case. Even the brightest, most capable people fall
victim to mental accounting biases. Even those who should be closest to the paradigm of
homo economicus are in fact homo sapiens.
Extensive research exists on the mental accounting biases stemming from
payment mechanism selection on consumer habits. These comparisons have previously
focused on the spending differences between consumers using cash, check, credit card,
debit card, and gift card as the way in which they access and spend their funds. However,
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research on the effects on mental accounting processes and biases in the emerging
domain of digital payment mechanisms is lacking. This paper seeks to extend previous
research on mental accounting and payment mechanisms by answering three main
questions. First, how do participants evaluate and account for money transferred through
peer-to-peer digital-payment systems such as Venmo or PayPal? Second, do participants
treat this money as completely fungible or do they file it in separate mental accounts?
And third, does a participant’s treatment of this money change along demographic
variables such as race, gender, age, education, vocation/major, etc.?
In order to answer these questions, this paper undertakes an experimental study in
which participants were given a set of instructions about their available resources.
Participants were split into two treatment groups based on the account in which they
received a $375 windfall. Participants were then asked to make decisions about the
payment mechanism they would use in different consumption scenarios (common
scenarios participants likely had encountered outside of the experiment). Results were
calculated in terms of percentage of participants in a treatment choosing a given payment
mechanism. These experimental results were also analyzed in regard to demographic
variables.
The experimental results offered strong evidence for the presence of mental
accounting biases for peer-to-peer digital-payment mechanisms. In general, participants
who received their windfall via a peer-to-peer digital-payment system chose to make
payments using their in-app balance. Participants who received their windfall via a
deposit into their checking account chose to make payments using a mechanism that
directly tapped their checking account. Participants who received their windfall via a
5

peer-to-peer digital-payment system were also more likely to tip and donate. Conditional
on choosing to tip or donate, participants who received their windfall via a peer-to-peer
digital-payment system tipped and donated more.
The following literature review in Section II examines and highlights previous
research on mental accounting biases and payment mechanisms, and the effects on
consumption. Section III details the methodology of the experimental study conducted
and the specific hypotheses. Section IV examines the experimental results. A discussion
of the results follows. Section V provides a general conclusion to the paper.
II:

Literature Review

Mental Accounting
Mental accounting differs from strict financial accounting in that it has no defined
rules; it is how an individual classifies, separates, and allocates resources. Mental
accounting differs from person to person, can influence future consumption decisions,
and lead to violation of normative economic principles. Chief among these principles are
the ideas that money is fungible (an individual can spend or save any given dollar equally
well independent of the account it is held in and situational factors), that funds are not
topically or temporally specific, and that self-control problems should not exist as all
actors are capable of utility maximization (Thaler 1985). However, mental accounting
biases do exist and in the words of Richard Thaler “mental accounting matters”. These so
called “mental accounting biases” are the ways in which specifying funds for a given use
case or allocating funds to a specific account or budget lead to violations of standard,
normative economic principles of utility maximization. As an example, an individual
may allocate a portion of their total wealth to a budget specific to purchasing clothing and
6

then face a pursuant reluctance to use the same funds to purchase other (perhaps more
essential) goods such as groceries. As a result, mental accounting biases stem from
individual perception and experience of outcomes, assignment of activities to specific
accounts, the frequency (or infrequency) with which accounts are evaluated, and account
framing (Thaler 1999). Mental accounting decisions and rules are far from neutral and
can dramatically affect the attractiveness of any given choice. The remainder of this
literature review examines particular aspects of mental accounting and mental accounting
biases as they pertain to consumer decisions using different payment mechanisms. These
aspects include account framing, accounts and budgets, fungibility, the “pain of paying”,
booking and posting, payment coupling, temporal separation, source effects, self-control,
and payment mechanisms.
Account Framing
Prospect theory1, the idea that individuals maintain a value function for gains and
losses judged against a reference point rather than their absolute value, is central to the
creation of mental accounts (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In fact, it is precisely this
phenomenon that allows individuals to determine their preferred choices and outcomes.
As explained by Richard Thaler (1999), account framing serves as the basis on which
mental accounting biases can affect the attractiveness of a choice. Thaler examines three
types of accounts. A minimal account is one in which an individual examines only the
differences between two outcomes. A topical account is one in which an individual
examines the consequences of possible choices against a reference level dependent on

1
Prospect theory also holds that individuals face diminishing sensitivity to losses and gains (both in size
and frequency). This, along with an asymmetric assessment of the value of losses and gains leads to loss
aversion, risk seeking when facing potential losses, and risk aversion when facing potential gains.
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context. A comprehensive account is one in which an individual incorporates all other
factors (current & future wealth, etc.) into their decision-making process. Mental
accounting is topical. This is to say that people make mental accounting decisions in
piecemeal based on context (ex: someone is less likely to buy a sweatshirt the day after
buying a shirt) and specific reference points (ex: the balance of one’s checking account).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that people generally disregard components
shared by the different choices they are considering. This tendency, the so-called
“isolation effect”, has been found to lead to inconsistent preferences for the same
choice(s) presented in different forms or framed differently. Kahneman and Tversky
developed a theory of choice where individuals judge outcomes against a reference
instead of the raw value of the outcome. Adjacent to this valuation, the individual
replaces probabilities with specific decision weights. Kahneman and Tversky found that
the value function is normally “concave” for gains and “convex” for losses2, such that
individuals face diminishing sensitivity. The proposed value function is generally steeper
for losses than for gains (ex: $10 lost hurts more than a $10 gained helps). Further,
decision weights were found to be lower than their corresponding probabilities, except
for low probabilities. As such, the overweighting (increased frequency) of low
probabilities contributes to the attractiveness of both protection against unlikely events
(insurance) and the prospects of longshot events (gambling). In a later paper, Kahneman
and Tversky (1984) found these strategies for valuing outcomes lead individuals to favor
risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses. Similarly, the assessment of the chance
of an outcome occurring leads to the overweighting of “certain” and “unlikely” events,
2

This creates an S-shape with the inflection point at the reference point.

8

relative to mid-probability events. Thus, choices and problems can be framed differently,
giving rise to inconsistent preferences, which violates the tenet of invariance held by
rational choice theory. As a consequence, the process of mental accounting, through
which individuals frame the outcomes of transactions, can help to explain some of the
anomalies of consumer behavior. Specifically, the acceptability of a choice is often
dependent on whether a (potential) negative outcome is defined as a cost or an
uncompensated loss.
As a consequence of mental account framing, it is imperative to examine the
differences between similar changes in wealth in regard to how they affect an
individual’s short-term changes in consumption. The mental accounting prediction for the
marginal propensity to consume a windfall varies with the size (amount) and location
(accounts with different balances present different reference points against which the
windfall is judged, ex: $50 into a $100 account versus $50 into a $10000 account).
Smaller windfalls are generally classified as current income and are spent more “easily”.
Larger windfalls are generally classified as an increase to one’s assets and an individual
is less likely to consume (Thaler 1990).
The next section evaluates the effects of different accounts and budgets on the
reference points used in the framing of consumption options.
Accounts and Budgets
The relevant differentiation between accounts and budgets for the present paper is
the distinction between two terms mentioned above: current income (ex: a raise, a gift)
and current assets (ex: home equity, savings accounts). Shefrin and Thaler (1988) have
shown that people distinguish between wealth in categories such as ''current spendable
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income" and "'current assets". A consequence of this categorization is that individuals are
more willing to consume increases in current income than they are the same increase in
current assets. Most individuals are tempted to consume all available resources in the
current period instead of saving for the future. Individuals who save for the future
demonstrate self-control, create mental accounts for their various assets and invest in a
diverse portfolio, storing money in a variety of locations with differing levels of
temptation. The funds in different accounts have different marginal propensities to
consume based on the level of temptation associated with that account. Specifically, the
setting up of such mental accounts implies that individuals are “framing” their resources
and consumption. Consumption spending then is dependent not only on total wealth but
also on how an individual’s assets are divided between accounts with different levels of
temptation. As a consequence, assets in current income accounts are often considered
“easier to spend” than assets in wealth accounts or future earnings.
Thaler (1999) extended these findings to help explain budgeting and consumption
behaviors. He found that expenditures are grouped to create budgets (food, housing, etc).
Wealth is grouped into accounts (checking, pension, rainy day). As a precursor
component of wealth, income is grouped into categories (regular or windfall). In order to
complete the mental accounting analogy, expenditures are tracked against budgets and
budgets are determined relative to wealth accounts. The specific steps in this process will
be examined later.
The act of placing funds in different accounts is an attempt at dealing with
consumption spending self-control problems through placing certain funds in “off-limits
accounts”. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) created a hierarchy of money locations based on
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temptation to spend (marginal propensity to consume decreases down the list). Current
assets such as cash on hand, money market holdings, and checking accounts are routinely
spent. Current wealth such as savings, stocks and bonds, and mutual funds are largely off
limits. Home equity and future income (money to be earned, received, or saved for later)
are essentially forbidden and only consumed in the case of crisis. Consequently, “A
powerful prediction of the mental accounting model is that if funds can be transferred to
less tempting mental accounts, they are more likely to be saved” (Thaler 1999).
Heath and Soll (1996) examined budgeting as the corollary to wealth account
classification. They found that people allocate money for certain classes of goods and
then determine if a good is relevant for a certain budget. The allocation of money is the
“budget-setting” process and the classification of a good to an account is the “expensetracking” process. These processes can create situations in which a budget affords too
much or too little money for the relevant expenses. Individuals are prone to sticking
closely to the budget they previously set and thus resist reallocating funds to budgets
where money would be better spent. Heath and Soll explain that for a budget to
effectively serve as a self-control mechanism, it must be accordingly inflexible. If people
readily reallocated at a whim, they risk greater temptation to engage in inappropriate
reallocations (splurging on luxuries with money marked for rent or groceries), as well as
appropriate ones (“forced” spending on a dinner out rather than more new clothing). Of
course, inflexibility has associated costs. If consumers trusted themselves to appropriately
reallocate resources as opportunities change, they could solve the utility maximization
problem on the basis of the resources and consumption opportunities that are actually
present rather than the ones that were anticipated.
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As a consequence of these accounts and budgets, how people label resources
becomes important in domains where resources are relatively unidimensional, namely
money, time, and effort. By labeling otherwise uniform resources (money, time, effort,
etc.), individuals aim to reduce their mental efforts and promote their self-control efforts
(Heath and Soll 1996; Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Kahneman and Lovallo 1993).
Expenditure labeling is then important in any domain in which people choose to pursue
multiple goals across multiple dimensions (ex: current and future utility).
Both accounts and budgets are specific categories that individuals use to facilitate
cognitive processes. A mental account is simply a specific category including the
advantages and disadvantages (positive and negative information) of the choice (element)
being categorized (Henderson and Peterson 1992). A mental account serves as the
foundation for expectations of a given choice (Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Thaler
1985). The relevant reference account or budget provides expectations and serves as a
guide for the evaluation of choices. The consequences of mental accounting biases have
been used to argue that the creation of mental accounts leads individuals to fail to
consider the entirety of their available resources. This failure leads to behavior that is
typically considered economically suboptimal, such as buying higher quality (more
expensive) gas when gas prices drop in order to still use the funds budgeted for gas as
opposed to saving or reallocating the surplus funds.
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) showed that the relevant reference point is
predominantly determined by the subjective status quo. However, reference points can
also be affected by expectations and comparisons. Objective improvements are often
experienced as a relative loss if they are judged against larger gains in other domains (ex:
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other individuals, different accounts). The experience of the gain or the loss associated
with a change is critically dependent on an individual’s adaptation to and accounting for
the change. Thus, the relevant outcomes of a decision are largely dependent not only on
the context of the decision but the separation and comparison of the decision against its
alternatives.
Mental accounts and budgets are far from perfect fixes for both the utility
maximization and self-control problems that they seek to solve. Cheema and Soman
(2006) showed that unbudgeted windfalls introduce flexibility into mental accounts,
allowing consumers to allocate gains at their discretion. The same 2006 research found
that individuals with predefined budget accounts created accounting flexibility by
assigning desirable expenses to either a general account or a more specific one,
depending on the balance available in a given account. Thus, consumption is not
effectively controlled because discretionary account and budget assignment can be used
to justify its occurrence. This phenomenon is exacerbated in the absence of well-defined
budgetary mental accounts. Cheema and Soman (2006) found that consumers faced with
an attractive expenditure opportunity often construct a "tailor-made" account (with a
positive balance) for the expenditure in order to justify it. Independent of “on the fly”
account construction, individuals were more likely to spend when the expense could be
allocated to a budgetary account with a surplus (Cheema and Soman 2006).
Of course, the creation (and ongoing modification) of mental accounts and
budgets highlighted above coupled with the resulting consumption biases lead to gross
deviations from standard economic theory. The next section examines the violation of
fungibility at the center of the mental accounting process.
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Fungibility vs Flexibility (Resource Labeling)
One of the primary anomalies of behavioral economics and the mental accounting
process is the violation of fungibility. Namely, standard economic theory holds that
regardless of how a dollar is earned, stored, or saved, that dollar will spend equally well
across all scenarios. Standard theory also assumes that an individual’s wealth is perfectly
fungible (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Friedman, 1957). Individuals are then
perfectly able to assess their resources and opportunities and make consumption and
savings decisions that will maximize utility. However, as highlighted previously,
individuals face constant temptation to consume rather than save, and attempt to exert
self-control by employing accounting and budgeting processes.
Thaler (1990) examined the mental accounting violations of fungibility. The
simple process of implicitly or explicitly allocating resources to specific uses (ex: specific
budgets for groceries, gas, or clothing) discriminates against the resources, which are
otherwise uniform. In the context of the life-cycle theory hypothesis, fungibility is what
allows the components of one’s wealth to be reduced to a single number indicating total
wealth. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Thaler (1990) introduced a behavioral life-cycle
hypothesis in which $100 found on the street has a higher marginal propensity to
consume than $100 in tax returns.
Mental accounting processes and biases affect the ways in which different sources
and uses of money are treated. A dollar earned one way is not equal to a dollar earned a
different way. The same can be said for a dollar held in one account (physical or mental)
versus another. The knock-on effects of supposed violations of fungibility are
economically significant. Not only does strict adherence to predetermined budgets inhibit
14

new opportunities, but flexible applications of mental accounting processes (call them
momentary realizations that money is, in fact, fungible) create opportunities for
individuals to get creative with their bookkeeping (physical and mental). Realizations of
fungibility and the ability to reallocate funds allow individuals to circumvent their selfestablished controls in favor of indulgences, the very behavior that their accounts and
budgets were put in place to avoid (Cheema and Soman 2006). Soman and Cheema
(2001) showed that this phenomenon of flexible accounting is particularly egregious in
the case of unbudgeted windfalls. As a consequence, consumers who receive an
unexpected windfall are able to allocate the gain to a mental account at their discretion
and thereby justify their consumption choices.
Booking and Posting
One of the ways in which individuals are able to manipulate, be it consciously or
unconsciously, their own mental account control mechanisms is through the process of
booking and posting incomes and expenditures. Heath and Soll (1996) showed that
expenses are tracked against budgets in two distinct steps. Heath and Soll (1996)
borrowed terminology from financial accounting and dubbed these steps “booking” and
“posting”. First, expenses must be noticed or “booked”. Second, the expenses must be
assigned to proper accounts or “posted”. One consequence of this two-step process is that
a given expenditure will not affect an individual’s mental accounting if either step fails.
Accurate booking is dependent on attention and memory. Thus, booking failures are
consequences of the capacity-limited nature of both attention and memory. Posting
failures are consequences of the posting process’s dependence on similarity judgments
and categorization, both of which are subjective and malleable. The overall effects of the
15

imprecision of the booking and posting processes are that individuals have some leeway
in how income and expenditures are accounted for. The effects are most exaggerated for
small, routine expenses that are not often booked (Heath and Soll 1996; Soman 2001;
Cheema and Soman 2006).
Payment Coupling
Booking and posting manipulations are far from the only uses of creative
bookkeeping. Individuals are able to mentally uncouple payments (loss, cost) from the
procured item (gain, benefit). Prelic and Loewenstein (1998) defined the psychological
linking of costs and benefits as "coupling". A given consumption and payment may be
“tightly coupled” when a consumption is clearly financed by a specific payment(s) or a
given payment is financing an act of consumption. Prelic and Loewenstein showed that
making a single payment for a good or service leads to tight coupling as it is obvious
exactly what is being paid for, when the payment is made, and what the source of
payment is. Prelic and Loewenstein (1998) found that with lesser degrees of coupling the
decisional benefits of mental accounting, namely one’s ability to mediate consumption
expenditures efficiently using an accurate assessment of costs, are greatly diminished.
The severity of coupling (or decoupling) is dependent on a number of factors, including
degrees of separation (temporal and physical) between payment and expenditure
recognition and payment mechanism.
Payment Separation and Depreciation
As previously highlighted, mental accounts are topically and temporally specific
(Thaler 1985; Johnson 1990). Gourville and Soman (1998) examined Thaler’s
proposition that an individual opens a mental account upon making payment and
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subsequently closes the transaction specific account upon consumption of the product. As
stated in the previous section, this process psychologically links the costs and benefits of
a given transaction, otherwise known as “coupling” (Prelic and Loewenstein 1998).
However, it must be noted that no loss or pain is felt at the time a payment is made
(Thaler 1985; Thaler 1999). Instead, upstream costs are held in the appropriate mental
account until the transaction and consumption are seen through. Should the transaction be
completed with the benefit (gain) consumed, the expenditure (loss) is weighed against the
benefit and the account is considered as a net gain. What account are the gains and losses
judged against? Previous research has indicated that while a newly obtained asset (item
or income) is originally seen as a gain, the gain will soon be incorporated into the
individual’s wealth profile (Thaler 1990; Thaler 1999). As such, payment depreciation is
not instantaneous, and the gradual discounting of a transaction payment only occurs with
the passage of time. Consequently, a downstream benefit (one separated from its
payment, such as in the case of a single payment for a subscription that yields multiple
items) should increasingly be viewed as a pure gain. Of course, this can only occur
should the payment be adequately separated from the account against which the gain is
judged, the reference point (Gourville and Soman 1998; Kahneman and Tversky 1979;
Kahneman and Tversky 1984).
As payments become increasingly separated from their benefits, the
psychophysics of consumption affect the mental accounting process. In particular,
expenditures (losses) become decoupled from their associated benefits (gains). The
separation, depreciation, and decoupling of payments all have significant effects on an
individual’s perceived “pain of paying”.
17

Pain of Paying
The psychological term “pain of paying” was coined by Zellermayer in his 1996
dissertation. Specifically, the pain of paying is the aversive impact of a payment. Certain
characteristics determine the pain felt for any given expenditure. Zellermayer (1996)
showed that individuals have payment-time and payment-mode preferences to offset the
“pain”. Consequently, the payment amount often plays less of a role than contextual
influences in determining the pain of payment. In particular, payment transparency is one
of the key contextual factors. Payment transparency is the specific vividness with which
the departure of a sum of money is felt. The more transparent the payment, the greater the
salience of parting with money, the greater the aversive impact of paying. Thus, the pain
of paying is likely greater for more transparent payment mechanisms. As a consequence,
reducing the salience of parting with money leads to psychological reductions in the
barriers to spending. With lower payment transparency and lower “pain of paying”,
consumption increases (Soman 2003; Raghubir and Srivastava 2008).
Prelic and Loewenstein (1998) found that a consumer’s ideal payment
arrangements are those that both facilitate rational spending and mitigate the pain of
paying. Effectively, these payment arrangements serve to create an illusion of “free”
benefits through manipulations of payment methods and mental accounting processes.
Hypothetically, one should be able to enjoy all of their possessions and activities as if
they were free. “The pain of paying is pure deadweight loss” (Prelic and Loewenstein
1998).

18

Source Effects
One factor that can influence the perceived characteristics of a payment and
consumption decisions is the effect of income and payment source. O’Curry (1997) found
that individuals tend to match the seriousness of the source of an income windfall to the
use of that windfall. This is to say that someone is more likely to purchase frivolous
goods with winnings from a sports bet than with the equivalent amount of money earned
in overtime pay. Similarly, the specific presentation of funds received (as a gift card
versus cash) has been found to influence the mental accounting of the funds themselves,
in turn influencing how the money is both allocated and spent (White 2008). As
previously highlighted, people distinguish between income and wealth in specific
categories such as ''current spendable income" and "'current assets". The willingness to
consume an increase in current income is far greater than the willingness to consume an
equivalent increase in current assets (Shefrin and Thaler 1988). Thaler (1990) showed
that the source of a change in wealth also matters. Some changes inherently belong to
specific accounts whereas others are easily allocated to a variety of possible locations.
Additionally, consumers are more likely to react (via a change in consumption) to salient,
specific income shocks than budget or account surpluses (Heath and Soll 1996). As such,
the budgetary constraint that tends to exert the most influence on current consumption
behavior is an individual’s current income flow rather than the present value of their
lifetime wealth (Thaler 1985).
Regardless of the mental accounting biases and the effect(s) caused by the source
of income or expenditure, individual’s still fall victim to the limits of their own selfcontrol. Best laid plans for budgets and accounting are only useful if adhered to. Of
19

course, the ambiguity and flexibility in the mental accounting processes allows for
individuals to “get creative” with their resources and circumvent their pre-established
self-control mechanisms.
Self-control
Put simply, mental accounting arises because of self-control problems (Thaler
1985). Self-control mechanisms (the physical or mental guidelines an individual puts in
place to facilitate a given course of action) are only effective if they are followed.
Frequently, individuals fail to adhere to their own pre-established mechanisms.
Baumeister (2002) highlighted three causes of self-control failure. Individuals often face
conflicting goals, such as when an immediate desire for consumption conflicts with a
future goal of saving. Individuals also have a hard time monitoring and judging their own
behaviors. Self-control is a limited resource and use of this resource makes self-control
efforts harder to maintain (Baumeister 2002).
Mental accounting related self-control failures are often the result of ambiguous
mental accounting processes. When individuals have the freedom get creative with their
bookkeeping, they can effectively circumvent their own pre-established controls. This
allows for consumption indulgences that they were initially attempting to avoid (Cheema
and Soman 2006). Individuals constantly face temptation to spend all of their resources
on current consumption instead of future savings. In the language of Baumeister (2002),
this is a failure in which an individual faces conflicting goals of immediate and future
satisfaction. Individuals who save, overcome this self-control problem by diversifying
their assets across different accounts, budgets, and forms that have different levels of
temptation associated with them (Shefrin and Thaler 1988).
20

As a consequence, how people choose to label and allocate their resources
(accounts and budgets) is important for resources that are relatively unidimensional like
money. Through the division and labeling of otherwise fungible resources, people seek to
simplify the cognitive calculations involved in decisions regarding these resources. The
simplification of cognitive processing in turn makes self-control efforts both easier and
more accountable (Heath and Soll 1996).
However, despite the mental accounting attempts at self-control, individuals still
face constant affronts to their planned consumption behavior. Chief among these affronts
are the variety of choice and resource framing manipulations created by different
payment forms and mechanisms.
Payment Mechanisms
Put simply, consumer behavior is significantly affected by different
representations of money (Soman 2001; Prelic and Simester 2001; Prelic and
Loewenstein 1998; Runnemark, Hedman, and Xiao 2015). The mechanism through
which money is spent can affect the transparency of the payment and the subsequent
willingness to pay. Soman (2001) showed that payment mechanisms can vary on two
variables, both the learning and rehearsal of the price paid and the immediacy with which
one’s wealth is depleted. It has been shown that consumers are more sensitive to changes
in their bank account balances than to payments that are in process (Sterman 1989).
Furthermore, individuals find payments that have not yet affected account levels to have
lower aversive impact (pain of paying) relative to the benefits of a transaction.
Specifically, past payments made by mechanisms that lead to immediate account
depletion decrease the intention for additional consumption from that account. This is a
21

consequence of spending a large amount in a category leading to greater recall of
category specific expenses (Soman 2001). Payment transparency is highly correlated with
a payment’s perceived aversive impact and the related “pain of paying” (Zellermayer
1996). By extension, the lower the payment transparency and recall, the greater an
individual’s consumption. This effect is weaker for products with less flexible
consumption rates such as rent (Soman 2003).
Different payment mechanisms can lead to increased consumption by decreasing
payment transparency, decreasing payment coupling, increasing temporal separation,
increasing cost-related recall errors, challenging feedback mechanisms, and decreasing
payment salience, vividness, and memory. Specifically, payment mechanisms other than
cash or check often lead consumers to underestimate previous expenditures in turn
increasing subsequent purchase intention (Soman 2001). Past payments exert
substantially more influence on future consumption if they result in the change of a
salient variable such as the balance of a specific account (Soman 2001; Raghubir and
Srivastava 2008). Specific effects of payment mechanism on consumption have been
studied for a variety of common card-based mechanisms (credit cards, debit cards, gift
cards, and pre-paid cards).
Chatterjee and Rose (2012) found priming with credit card as the relevant
payment mechanism led to more cost-related recall errors for a given product. Individuals
primed with credit cards more readily identify benefits than consumers primed with cash.
Payment mechanism priming effects influence purchase choice with credit card-primed
consumers showing increased likelihood to choose purchase options that offer more
benefits than those primed with cash. Cash-primed individuals were more likely to
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choose options that dominated on cost despite offering inferior benefits. Similarly,
Soman (2001) found that payments made by check lead to greater recall of expenditures
due to tighter associations of payments and transactions (Prelic and Loewenstein 1998).
Paying by credit card decreases salience and vividness for expenditures, resulting in a
weaker memory for the expense(s). Thaler (1999) highlighted the effectiveness of credit
cards as a decoupling device. Credit cards effectively facilitate spending by postponing
payment by a few weeks, mentally separating the purchase from the payment.
Additionally, once the bill arrives purchases are mixed together, and any individual
purchase is judged against the relevant reference point of the whole bill rather than as a
stand-alone (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). Thus, payments by credit card can result in
the disassociation of payments and benefits, resulting in a weaker aversive impact of a
given payment (Hirschman 1979; Soman 2001; Soman and Gourville 2001). Studies
performed by Soman (2001) suggest that payments made via credit-card are less salient
and less memorable than both cash and check payments. As a consequence, consumers
who finance consumption with credit cards demonstrate weaker retrospective evaluation
and exaggerated perception of their available resources. This increases the likelihood that
consumers using credit cards as their payment mechanism will purchase additional
discretionary goods (Soman 2001; Prelic and Loewenstein 1998). Raghubir and
Srivastava (2008) found that cash purchases tightly couple consumption and payment
increasing the pain of paying. Credit card purchases separate the expenditure from the
purchase decision, decreasing the pain of paying. Consequently, credit card use leads to
increased spending (versus cash). Individuals can separate the immediate gratification of
consumption from the pain of paying they will face in the future. People tend to
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underestimate this future pain and spend more with a credit card than cash (Hirschman
1979).
Payment mechanism effects have also been found for gift cards versus cash
(White 2008). Receiving funds as a gift card versus cash influences the mental
accounting for the funds themselves. This can influence how the money is later spent.
Individuals are more likely to consume all of the funds when the funds came in the form
of a gift card instead of cash (White 2008). Participants receiving gift card funds were not
only more likely to spend the gift funds, but also spent additional funds from their other
accounts. Thus, the simple receipt of funds on a gift card led to increased spending of
both windfall and non-windfall funds. Gift card recipients nearly doubled their intended
spending, even spending more than the amount of the gift itself. In contrast, individuals
who received cash reported an intention to spend roughly the exact amount of funds they
received.
Runnemark, Hedman, and Xiao (2015) found similar effects for the use of debit
cards as the payment mechanisms. This finding is particularly interesting as debit cards
differ from cash only in the format and representation of funds, and not in the temporal
separation aspects associated with credit card usage. The researchers found that
willingness to pay is higher for debit cards than for cash. Likewise, Soetevent (2011)
found that conditional on choosing to donate money, debit cards lead to increased
donations relative to cash. Runnermark, Hedman, and Xiao (2015) also highlighted the
need for future research addressing the use of new and old non-cash payment methods
and online spending. They suggested studying differences between using credit or debit
cards and digital-payment systems when shopping online.
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Prior payments strongly reduce future purchases and decrease willingness to pay
when the payment mechanism enforces rehearsal of the amount paid, and result in
immediate and salient account balance depletion. However, real-world payment
mechanism selection is often accidental and determined by what is in one’s wallet, what a
retailer accepts, accessibility, peer group norms, or that certain payments are always paid
via a given mechanism. However, as innovation breeds ever-increasing varieties of
payment mechanisms, many of these payment mechanisms become increasingly distant
from conventional cash-based transactions (Gourville and Soman 1998). Runnemark,
Hedman, and Xiao (2015) have documented that the focus of modern payment
mechanisms has shifted to the mobile phone and its capabilities as a payment device. As
a result, they predict that cash will eventually become obsolete, and we will have a
cashless society.
Mallat (2007) suggested that the relative advantages of mobile payments include
location independence, increased availability, and remote purchase ability. Participants
found that mobile payments are highly compatible with digital purchases and often
complement small value cash payments. However, the findings also suggest that the
specific advantages of mobile payment systems are conditional on situational factors such
as availability of other payment methods or payment urgency. In a follow up study,
Dahlberg, Mallat, Ondrus, and Zmijewska (2008) found that for most purchases, mobile
payments tend to complement or compete with the previous standards of cash, checks,
credit cards, and debit cards. Of course, just like other non-cash payment mechanisms,
digital payment mechanisms come with associated biases which influence consumption
and spending. Individuals are prone to biases in spending when they use nonlegal (non25

cash) tender. Treating nonlegal tender as play money leads to mental accounting biases,
self-control failures, and overspending (Raghubir and Srivastava 2008).
Peer-to-peer Digital-payment
Research done by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis examined the popularity
of and increasing use of peer-to-peer digital payment mechanisms. Caceres-Santamaria
(2020) explained that decisions to split a restaurant bill and contribute to a gift for a
friend previously required withdrawing money from an ATM or writing a check. Peer-topeer digital-payment services now allow users to make payments and money transfers via
bank accounts linked to an app, which eases the movement of funds between accounts at
different banks. Approximately 36 percent of adults in the United States are using peerto-peer digital-payment services and 40.4 percent of mobile phone users conducted at
least one transaction using a peer-to-peer system on a monthly basis. Mobile phone users
can use peer-to-peer payment systems through a variety of apps with industry leaders
such as PayPal, Venmo, and Zelle. Some payment apps are exclusively offered through
banks as a service to existing account holders. Third-party apps (such as PayPal, Venmo,
and Zelle) require user authorization for the app to access information from personal
bank accounts. Peer-to-peer systems facilitate economic activity through lowering
transaction costs.
Once initial setup of the app is complete, users do not need each other's bank
details for payments or fund transfers. Many of the peer-to-peer apps also have a digital
wallet function where money received can be stored for later use or transfer. If users do
not use the money stored in the digital wallet to make future payments through the app,
the money can be transferred to the linked card or bank account.
26

III:
Methods & Experimental Design
Participants were 98 individuals (52 male, 45 female, 1 unstated) recruited using
Amazon Mechanical Turk (restricted to participants 18+ and located in the United
States). Specific demographic information regarding the participants pool can be found in
Appendix A. Recruited participants were given an approximately 10-minute online
questionnaire and they were compensated $2.50 via the Amazon Mechanical Turk
payment system.
The first page of the questionnaire gave requisite details about the study and
elicited informed consent. Following the informed consent page, participants were asked
a series of demographic questions including age, gender, ethnicity, education, estimated
annual household income, estimated current balance of primary checking account, and
self-reported self-control on a five-level scale (from extremely bad to extremely good). A
participant’s reported checking account balance was used as part of a check for fund
integration3 (or lack thereof) after receiving the treatment specific windfall. This specific
manipulation is discussed in greater detail below. Participants were also asked to report
their familiarity and usage of peer-to-peer digital-payment systems. The demographic
questions are contained in both treatment versions of the experimental instrument in the
“Demographic Qs” block (Appendix B and Appendix C).
Following the demographic portion of the questionnaire, participants were given
some basic information about the function of peer-to-peer digital-payment systems. This

3
Fund integration refers to the process of mentally incorporating a gain (income, windfall, etc.) into one’s
total available resources. This is simply the difference between viewing $500 of current assets and $50 of
gain as existing in separate accounts, or viewing the same total as $550 in one account.
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information included specific information about a hypothetical peer-to-peer digitalpayment system being used in the study. Participants were required to complete an
understanding check of the information before they could proceed to the experimental
questions. This included the fact that any amount paid via Peer Pay in excess of the inapp balance would be funded using a transfer from the linked checking account. The
information about peer-to-peer digital-payment systems and the understanding check are
contained in both treatment versions of the experimental instrument in the “Peer Pay
Info” block (Appendix B and Appendix C).
For the treatment specific portion of the experiment, participants were randomly
placed in one of two treatments. The first treatment will be referred to as the Peer Pay
treatment (experimental instrument in Appendix B). In the Peer Pay treatment,
participants were told:
You have just been sent $375 via Peer Pay. $375 is now being held within
your Peer Pay In-App balance. Any payments made via Peer Pay in excess
of this amount will require money to be taken from the linked checking
account.
Assume that you have current access to the balance of your checking
account(s) that you disclosed when answering the demographic questions.
This checking account is the account that is linked to your Peer Pay
account. Assume that you can pay funds from the checking account
whenever you want: you can access these funds by paying with a bank
card, withdrawing cash, writing a check, or via Peer Pay.
Assume that you do not have any cash available.
The second treatment will be referred to as the Checking treatment (experimental
instrument in Appendix C). In the Checking treatment, participants were told:
$375 has been deposited to your checking account. Assume that you
have current access to this $375 added to the balance of your checking
account that you disclosed when answering the demographic questions.
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This checking account is the account that is linked to your Peer Pay
account. Assume that you can pay funds from the checking account
whenever you want: you can access these funds by paying with a bank
card, withdrawing cash, writing a check, or via Peer Pay.
You have no current balance being held within your Peer Pay In-App
balance. Any payments made via Peer Pay will require money to be
transferred from the linked checking account.
Assume that you do not have any cash available.
Following the treatment specific information regarding the location of the
windfall, participants were asked to verify the amount contained in their Peer Pay in-app
balance and their linked checking account. In the Peer Pay treatment, participants needed
to report that the amount contained in their Peer Pay in-app balance was $375 (the
amount given to them) and that the amount in their checking account was equal to the
amount they initially reported in the demographic portion before they could continue to
the payment mechanism selection and consumption questions. In the Checking treatment,
participants needed to report that the amount contained in their Peer Pay in-app balance
was $0 and the amount in their checking account had increased by $375 over the amount
initially reported in the demographic portion before they could continue to the payment
mechanism selection and consumption questions. This check was put in place as a
manipulation check in order to ensure that participants in the Checking treatment had
integrated the windfall into their checking account balance and were not simply treating
the windfall as a separate source of funds. In addition, this check served to reinforce the
separation of windfall location in the Peer Pay treatment.
Other than the information provided above, the two treatments were
identical and the participants in each treatment were asked identical questions
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about their respective payment mechanism preference and consumption decisions
given their available resources. Each treatment was designed to maintain similar
access to both payment mechanisms regardless of whether the windfall was
deposited into an individual’s Peer Pay app or checking account.
The questions about payment mechanism selection and consumption decisions
were constructed to represent common scenarios that participants were likely to have
previously encountered in real life. Common scenarios were used in order to mitigate any
potential effects of participants needing to assess their likelihood of consumption. This
allowed participants to be able to focus on their payment mechanism choice as the
relevant decision, rather than spending time justifying the consumption in the first place.
The scenarios varied on the regularity of the payment, payment size, ability to tip or
donate, and/or the requirement to pay a premium for using a given payment method. The
specific scenarios included splitting a dinner bill ($65 bill total), paying rent ($350 or
$4004), paying for a haircut ($20 with the option to tip), purchasing a shirt from a street
vendor ($15 with cash, $16 with Peer Pay), buying a bottle of wine ($10 standard
purchase or $25 splurge), and donating to charity (amount chosen by participant). For
each question, the participant was given the choice between paying via Peer Pay or via
the most relevant mechanism for direct use of checking account funds for the given
scenario (bank card, check, or cash withdrawn from a nearby ATM). Participants in the

4

The two versions of the paying rent question ($350 and $400) were included to examine potential
differences for how participants made payment mechanism choices when the payment was less than or
greater than the windfall. The $400 condition, where the payment was greater than the windfall amount,
was included to test if participants treated money as fluid between Peer Pay and their linked checking
account. Choosing the Peer Pay payment option in the $400 condition required the participant to spend
more money than they had in their Peer Pay in-app balance, drawing the remaining funds from the linked
checking account.
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checking treatment, who had $0 in their Peer Pay in-app balance, were still given the
option to pay via Peer Pay with the knowledge that the necessary funds for the payment
would be taken from their linked checking account. The questions were identical for the
two treatments (“Peer Pay Treatment” block in Appendix B and “Checking Treatment”
block in Appendix C). This study was thus designed to examine the effects of mental
accounting biases on payment mechanism choice and consumption decisions by offering
different payment mechanism choices in standard consumption scenarios.
The experiment consequently employed a between-participants design, focusing
on the differences in payment mechanism choice and consumption choice between the
Peer Pay and Checking treatment groups. The solicitation of demographic information
served both as a control for the differences between the two treatments (do
demographically similar participants show differences across treatments?) and as a way
to parse results more specifically and examine differences across demographic variables.
Following the completion of the payment mechanism selection and consumption
questions, participants were debriefed and compensated.
Hypotheses
H1:
Previous research has shown that different payment methods and forms can have
significant effects on individual willingness to pay and consumption choices. Individuals
are more likely to spend using payment methods that decouple the aversive “pain of
paying” for a purchase from the benefits of said purchase. Likewise, income sources
(specifically windfall sources) have significant effects on mental accounting and
consumer choice processes. Prior research has shown that unanticipated windfalls create
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flexible mental accounts, thus allowing consumers to allocate windfall gains to a given
mental account with discretion. In addition, it has been found that an individual’s choice
of a payment mechanism is frequently driven by considerations like convenience (what is
in one’s wallet), acceptability (retailers accepting or not accepting a given payment
method), accessibility (no convenient ATM), and habit (certain payments are usually
made via a given method).
Given the above mental accounting biases, I would expect that participants will
choose to spend money via payment mechanism that matches the account/location the
windfall was sent to5. The two conditions: 1) windfall sent via Peer Pay app and 2)
windfall sent via direct deposit into the participant’s checking account, should result in
the payment method selection matching the windfall account/location. Therefore, my first
hypothesis is as follows:
H1a: participants in the Peer Pay treatment will choose Peer Pay as their payment
mechanism more frequently than participants in the Checking treatment
&
H1b: participants in the Peer Pay treatment will on average choose to use Peer
Pay as their payment mechanism
&
H1c: participants in the Checking treatment will on average choose to use their
checking account as their payment mechanism
H2:
As stated above, previous research has shown that income source and payment
method options can both affect an individual’s budgeting and consumption choices. Other
research has shown that mental accounts are topical with people making budgeting and
consumption decisions based on present, situation-based context rather than a more

5

This may not be the case if the consumption need is greater than the windfall amount. This particular case
is addressed in H2.
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global context. Consumers are more likely to react to salient income shocks (ex: the
addition of $50 to an account) than to equivalent surpluses (ex: $50 that has not been
spent out of a particular budget or account). Research has shown that consumers are more
willing to spend from an increase in current income than an increase in current assets and
are most willing to spend windfall income.
Similarly, it has been found that gains are judged relative to distinct wealth and
income accounts. Thus, the source of a change in wealth matters. Therefore, ambiguity in
the mental accounting process (both through income source and payment method) allows
the individual to use creative “bookkeeping” to bypass their own established budgeting
controls, and to indulge in unintended purchases. As a parallel, past research has shown
there exists a hierarchy of money/wealth locations based on temptation and propensity to
spend. Current income (cash on hand, money market, checking accounts) are the most
readily and routinely spent. Accessibility6 of current income across payment methods is
variable, and research has shown that consumer spending is influenced by available
payment options with different degrees of accessibility and pain of payment. For
example, previous research has shown increased spending and consumption for
individuals choosing to pay with credit or debit instead of check or cash. In fact, it has
been shown that conditional on choosing to donate money, paying with debit cards lead
to higher donations compared to cash. Similar effects have been found when gift funds
(windfall) were presented as a gift card rather than as cash. Not only were individuals
likely to consume all of the windfall increase, but they were also more likely to spend

6

The ability to use funds by paying via the chosen mechanism in a given scenario (ex: some retailers do
not accept credit cards or checks).
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additional funds from their current assets. Finally, it has been shown that individuals are
prone to increased spending when using “nonlegal tender” due to the treatment of such
funds as “play money”.
Given the findings of the previous research highlighted above, I expect that
participants who receive windfall funds/income via Peer Pay will display greater
marginal propensity to consume their allotted windfall when compared to the participants
who receive the windfall via a deposit to their checking account. I also expect
participants to match the expenditure and payment method accountability7 such that small
to moderate windfall purchases will be made using Peer Pay, a mechanism that does not
result in salient changes to checking account balance. Likewise, larger, more serious
expenditures will be made from the checking account, a more accountable (resulting in
salient changes to checking account balance) money location. Therefore, my second
hypothesis is as follows:
H2a: participants in the Peer Pay treatment will on average choose to tip more and
donate more than participants in the Checking treatment (ex: hairdresser and
donation)
&
H2b: participants in the Peer Pay treatment will choose to pay a premium to use
Peer Pay whereas participants in the Checking treatment will choose to use their
checking account (ex: street vendor selling a shirt)
&
H2c: participants in the Peer Pay treatment will on average choose to make more
extraordinary purchases whereas the participants in the Checking treatment will
not (ex: street vendor selling a shirt, luxury bottle of wine)
&
H2d: participants in both treatments will on average choose to pay large payments
(greater than 50% of the windfall amount, ex: rent) using their checking account
&
H2e: participants in both treatments will prefer to pay payments greater than the
windfall amount using their checking account
7

Accountability in this context refers to how a payment method effects specific account balances.
Accountable payment methods are characterized by immediate and salient depletion of account balances.
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H3:
Prior research has shown that consumption habits and mental accounting biases
vary on demographic variables such as age, gender, education level, wealth/income level,
and self-control. It has been found that debit card use decreases with age, while check use
increases with age, and credit use is highest in 65+ (credit score is higher due to a better
history of purchases and payments). Overall, younger individuals are more likely to
spend windfall income than older individuals both due to differences in self-control and
differences in the salient reference point of total wealth (older individuals tend to have
greater total wealth and thus the perceived relative value a given amount of is less than
for younger individuals with less total wealth). Similar findings have been found across
education levels with individuals who have lower education levels showing greater use of
cash and less use of checks and credit when compared to individuals who are more
educated.
Likewise, consumption habits, payment method use, and mental
accounting/budgeting biases have been found to vary on individual wealth/income level.
Previous research has shown that specific mental accounting and budgeting behaviors are
more important for low-wealth individuals (Xiao and O’Neill 2018). Individuals with low
income face amplified pain of paying and as such seek out methods that decouple
consumption from payment. Additionally, low-income individuals judge income against
a lower initial reference point (the money already in an account) and as such are subject
to the biases created by the psychophysics of money. This is to say that $50 added to an
account with a $100 balance appears to be a much larger gain than $50 added to an
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account with a $100,000 balance. As such, previous research has shown that low-income
individuals show a greater tendency to consume current income than high(er)-income
individuals.
Variations in self-control traits and characteristics have also been found to affect
consumption and mental accounting biases. Results from prior research indicate that
individuals who demonstrate impulsivity as a personality trait are more likely to make
extraordinary purchases than the normal consumer. It has been found that the primary
motivation for such impulsivity and the resultant lack of self-control comes from the
consumption and expenditure processes rather than from the possession or use of the
purchased goods or services. Simply, those who are more impulsive and have lower selfcontrol receive more pleasure and utility from the action of spending. Accordingly, prior
research has found that individuals who rate highly on self-control show lesser tendencies
towards splurge spending and violations of budgeting and planned utility maximization.
Given the above research findings, I expect that participants will display differing
consumption tendencies and mental accounting biases dependent on their demographics.
I expect that younger individuals will show a greater marginal propensity to consume
than older participants. I expect that less educated individuals will show a greater
marginal propensity to consume than more educated individuals. I expect that lower
wealth/income individuals will show a greater marginal propensity to consume than
higher wealth/income individuals. I expect that more impulsive, lower self-control
individuals will show a greater marginal propensity to consume than less impulsive,
higher self-control individuals. Therefore, my third hypothesis is as follows:
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H3a: younger participants (29 & under) will on average spend more on tips and
donations than older participants (30 & over) independent of treatment and will
on average show greater tendencies for increased spending in the Peer Pay
treatment (when compared to Checking treatment)
&
H3b: participants who have achieved higher levels of education (4-year degree or
greater) will on average spend less on tips and donations than participants with
lower levels of education (less than a 4-year degree) and will on average show
lower tendencies for increased spending in the Peer Pay treatment (when
compared to Checking treatment)
&
H3c: participants who have higher annual income balances will on average show
lower tendencies for increased spending in the Peer Pay treatment (when
compared to Checking treatment)
&
H3d: participants who self-report as high self-control will on average spend less
on tips and donations independent of treatment and will on average show lower
tendencies for increased spending in the Peer Pay treatment (when compared to
Checking treatment)
The hypothesis above does not encompass all of my expectations on demographic
differences, I also expect to see differences across gender and ethnicity. However, there is
not enough prior research to make educated hypotheses about the directionality or scope
of the differences along these variables.
Section IV:
Peer Pay Treatment Versus Checking Treatment Results
The treatment specific results show that participants in the Peer Pay treatment
were significantly more likely to select Peer Pay as their payment method when
compared to the participants in the Checking treatment across all scenarios. When asked
to split the cost of going out to dinner with a friend, participants in the Peer Pay treatment
chose Peer Pay as the payment mechanism 77.55% of the time whereas participants in the
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Checking treatment chose Peer Pay 55.10% of the time (p = 0.01)8, as seen in Graph 1.
These results are in line with the predictions from H1a and H1b, while the slight
preference for choosing Peer Pay in the Checking treatment is contrary to what was
predicted by H1c.
*********************************************************************
Insert Graph 1 here
*********************************************************************
Graph 2 shows that when asked to pay their $350 rent (less than the $375
windfall), participants in the Peer Pay treatment chose Peer Pay as the payment
mechanism 48.98% of the time whereas participants in the Checking treatment chose
Peer Pay 12.24% of the time (p = 0.00). These results are in part contrary to what was
predicted by H1a and H1b. However, it is worth noting the marked increase in the
selection of Peer Pay as the payment mechanism in the Peer Pay treatment as indicative
of significant bias. The percentage of participants selecting to pay via checking account
strongly supports the predictions of H1c (use of checking account in the Checking
treatment) and H2d (use of checking account for large payments).
*********************************************************************
Insert Graph 2 here
*********************************************************************
Graph 3 shows that when asked to pay their $400 rent (greater than the $375
windfall), participants in the Peer Pay treatment chose Peer Pay as the payment

8

All p-values are one-tail p-values calculated for difference in percentage of participants selecting Peer Pay
versus Checking between treatments (unless otherwise noted)
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mechanism 30.61% of the time (18.37% less frequently than in the $350 rent scenario).
Participants in the Checking treatment chose Peer Pay 10.20% of the time (2.04% less
frequently than in the $350 rent scenario). The difference in payment mechanism
selection between the two treatments remained significant (p = 0.01). These results are
again contrary to what was predicted by H1a and H1b. The marked increase in the
selection of Peer Pay as the payment mechanism in the Peer Pay treatment is indicative of
significant bias towards using available funds in the participant’s Peer Pay balance.
Further, the percentage of participants selecting to pay via checking account strongly
supports the predictions of H1c (use of checking account in the Checking treatment), H2d
(use of checking account for payments greater than 50% of windfall), and H2e (use of
checking account for payments greater than windfall).
*********************************************************************
Insert Graph 3 here
*********************************************************************
Comparing the results from the two rent scenarios ($350 and $400) discussed
above, it is notable that participants in the Peer Pay treatment displayed significant
differences in payment mechanism selection depending on whether or not the payment
amount was less than or greater than the windfall amount (p = 0.03). This difference
suggests an upper limit on the influence of the mental accounting biases that is bound by
the amount of the windfall. This difference exists despite the ability to split payments
greater than the in-app balance between the available in-app funds and the linked
checking account. Meanwhile, participants in the Checking treatment showed
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insignificant differences in payment mechanism selection between the two scenarios (p =
0.37).
Graph 4 shows that when asked to pay for a haircut, participants in the Peer Pay
treatment chose Peer Pay as the payment mechanism 73.47% of the time whereas
participants in the Checking treatment chose Peer Pay 26.53% of the time (p = 0.00).
These results are in line with the predictions from H1a, H1b, and H1c.
*********************************************************************
Insert Graph 4 here
*********************************************************************
Graph 5 shows that when given the option to tip a barber or hairdresser Peer Pay
treatment participants were not significantly more likely to tip than their Checking
treatment counterparts (95.92% choosing to tip in Peer Pay treatment versus 91.84% in
Checking treatment, p = 0.20). However, conditional on choosing to tip, Peer Pay
treatment participants chose to tip more than their Checking treatment counterparts
($5.65 mean tip amount versus $4.78, p = 0.05)9. This is consistent with the prediction of
H2a (Peer Pay treatment will tip and donate more than Checking treatment).
*********************************************************************
Insert Graph 5 here
*********************************************************************
Graph 6 shows that Peer Pay treatment participants were not significantly more
likely than their Checking treatment counterparts to pay a premium to use Peer Pay as
their payment mechanism (12.24% versus 8.16%, p = 0.25) when given the option to not
9

p-value is the one-tail p-value calculated for difference in mean tip amount between treatments

40

buy the shirt. This is inconsistent with the prediction of H2b. Inconsistent with the
prediction of H2c, Peer Pay treatment participants (61.22%) were less likely to buy the
shirt (extraordinary purchase) than Checking treatment participants (75.51%) (p = 0.07).
*********************************************************************
Insert Graph 6 here
*********************************************************************
Graph 7 shows that Peer Pay treatment participants were significantly more likely
than their Checking treatment counterparts to purchase a luxury bottle of wine (an
extraordinary purchase) using Peer Pay as their payment mechanism (24.49% versus
14.29%, p = 0.10) when given the option to not buy the luxury wine. This is consistent
with the predictions of H1a and H2c. Conditional on choosing to buy the wine, the
preference for choosing Peer Pay in the Peer Pay treatment was significant and consistent
with the prediction of H1b (p = 0.10). Conditional on choosing to buy the wine, the slight
preference for choosing Peer Pay in the Checking treatment was not significant enough to
be considered inconsistent with the prediction of H1c (p = 0.29). Consistent with the
prediction of H2c, Peer Pay treatment participants (36.73%) were more likely to buy the
luxury wine (extraordinary purchase) than Checking treatment participants (24.49%) (p =
0.10).
*********************************************************************
Insert Graph 7 here
*********************************************************************
Graph 8 shows that, when given the option to donate to charity, there was not a
significant difference in the choice to donate between the two treatments (67.35% in Peer
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Pay treatment versus 71.43% in Checking treatment, p = 0.33). Graph 8 also shows that
when opting to donate, Peer Pay treatment participants chose to donate using Peer Pay
significantly more than their Checking treatment counterparts (Peer Pay participants
49.0% versus Checking participants 28.6%, p = 0.02). This is consistent with the
prediction of H1a. Peer Pay treatment participants also chose to donate using Peer Pay
significantly more than they chose to donate using their checking account (49.0% with
Peer Pay mechanism versus 18.4% with checking account mechanism, p = 0.06),
consistent with H1b. Checking treatment participants also chose to donate using their
checking account more than they chose to donate using Peer Pay (42.9% with checking
account mechanism versus 28.6% with Peer Pay mechanism, p = 0.12), consistent with
H1c.
*********************************************************************
Insert Graph 8 here
*********************************************************************
Graph 9 shows that on choosing to donate, Peer Pay treatment participants chose
to donate significantly more than their Checking treatment counterparts ($27.85 mean
donation versus $12.46, p = 0.00)10. This is consistent with the prediction of H2a (Peer
Pay treatment will tip and donate more than Checking treatment).
*********************************************************************
Insert Graph 9 here
*********************************************************************

10

p-value is the one-tail p-value calculated for difference in mean donation amount between treatments
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Demographic Specific Results
Demographic specific results show that payment mechanism selection and
windfall consumption differ between certain groups. Table 1 shows the effect of age on
payment mechanism, tipping, and donation preferences across treatments. Independent of
treatment and scenario, younger participants consistently chose to pay via Peer Pay more
frequently than their older counterparts. Younger participants also tipped and donated
greater amounts on average. Additionally, younger participants increased tipping and
donating in the Peer Pay treatment (versus Checking treatment) by a greater amount than
older participants ($1.05 difference in average tip and $48.00 difference in average
donation between treatment for younger participants versus $0.86 tip difference and
$10.91 donation difference for older participants). These results strongly support H3a’s
predictions that younger participants would spend more on tips and donations and show
greater differences in tendencies across treatments.
*********************************************************************
Insert Table 1 here
*********************************************************************
Table 2 shows the effects of education level on payment mechanism, tipping, and
donation preferences across treatments. Trends across all payment mechanism selections
and spending scenarios showed no significant differences between participants who had
achieved higher levels of education versus those who achieved lower levels of education.
The only significant difference in choice between the higher and lower education
participants was seen in the choice to donate to charity as less educated participants were
more likely to donate (77.0% of lower education choosing to donate versus 64.6% of
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higher education). However, those with higher education who chose to donate donated a
similar amount to their lower education counterparts. These results offer no real support
for the predictions of H3b, that higher education individuals would spend less on tips and
donations and show less differences in tendencies across treatments.
*********************************************************************
Insert Table 2 here
*********************************************************************
Table 3 shows the effects of annual household income on payment mechanism,
tipping, and donation preferences across treatments. On average, higher income
participants showed lower tendencies for different payment mechanism selection between
treatments than their lower income counterparts. Higher income participants were on
average more likely to purchase luxury goods (60.4% choosing to purchase luxury wine
versus 24.7% of lower income individuals). Higher income participants also tended to tip
more, with greater difference between treatments ($5.63 average tip versus $5.03 for
lower income individuals). Donations were not consistently higher for higher income
individuals but were more varied with greater average differences between treatments.
These results are generally inconclusive regarding the predictions of H3c which
hypothesized that higher income participants will on average have lower tendencies for
increased spending in the Peer Pay treatment.
*********************************************************************
Insert Table 3 here
*********************************************************************
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Table 4 shows the effects of perceived self-control on payment mechanism,
tipping, and donation preferences across treatments. Participants who rated themselves as
having “Somewhat bad” self-control tipped and donated a significantly greater amount
($5.31 average tip and $22.17 average donation) than those participants who rated their
own self-control as “Somewhat good” or “Extremely good” ($5.08 average tip and
$19.92 average donation). Lower self-control participants were also more likely to pay a
premium to use their Peer Pay in-app balance (25% of low self-control participants
choosing to pay premium to use Peer Pay balance versus 9.6% for higher self-control
participants) and were more likely to spend their windfall on luxury goods than those
participants who rated higher on self-control. These results offer support for the
predictions of H3d, that high self-control participants will spend less on tips and
donations independent of treatment and will not increase spending in the Peer Pay
treatment as much as low self-control participants.
*********************************************************************
Insert Table 4 here
*********************************************************************
Table 5 shows the effects of checking account balance on payment mechanism,
tipping, and donation preferences across treatments. Participants with higher checking
account balances chose to tip and donate greater amounts on average than those
participants with lower checking account balances ($5.81 average tip and $32.27 average
donation for participants with higher checking account balances versus $4.88 tip and
$15.34 donation for participants with lower balances). There were no other consistent and
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significant differences in tendencies between participants with different checking account
balances.
*********************************************************************
Insert Table 5 here
*********************************************************************
Table 6 shows the effects of ethnicity on payment mechanism, tipping, and
donation preferences across treatments. Given the large majority (77 of 98 total) of white
participants relative to participants of other ethnicities, it is not possible to draw
meaningful conclusions from the results. However, it is interesting to note that white
participants had a higher average donation ($22.35 average donation for white
participants) conditional on choosing to donate than participants of other ethnicities
($12.46 average donation).
*********************************************************************
Insert Table 6 here
*********************************************************************
Table 7 shows the effects of gender on payment mechanism, tipping, and donation
preferences across treatments. Treatment dependent payment mechanism selection was
very similar between genders. The greatest differences between genders were in relation
to luxury purchases and donations. Female identifying participants were more likely use
their windfall to purchase the luxury wine and donate than their male identifying
counterparts (40.8% choosing to buy wine and 77.2% choosing to donate for female
participants versus 21.2% and 60.6% respectively for male participants). However,
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conditional on choosing to donate, there was not a considerable difference in amount
donated between the two genders.
*********************************************************************
Insert Table 7 here
*********************************************************************
Discussion of Results
The experimental study undertaken by this paper yielded both treatment specific
results and demographic specific results that were consistent with the majority of the
predictions made in the hypotheses of this paper. Not only were the results indicative of
the predicted mental accounting biases for use of peer-to-peer digital-payment systems,
most of these results were also significant at the most stringent statistical levels.
Conventional measures of statistical significance are benchmarked using a one-sided pvalue of 0.05. Results (measured as the difference in percentage of participants in each
treatment making a choice) for six of the nine consumption questions yielded p-values of
less than 0.01. One result yielded a p-value of 0.05. One result yielded a p-value of 0.10.
The only treatment specific result that was not statistically significant was the T-Shirt
Premium scenario, for which the results were mixed. While more participants in the Peer
Pay treatment chose to pay a premium to use Peer Pay, there were also more participants
in the Peer Pay treatment who chose not to buy the t-shirt at all. A total sample size of 98
(49 per treatment) gives adequate, if not considerable, power for a between-subjects
design.
On the whole, the treatment specific results indicate that individuals who receive
a windfall via a peer-to-peer digital-payment system are more likely to make future
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payments using said system than individuals who receive the same windfall amount via a
deposit to their checking account. The same participants receiving the windfall via peerto-peer digital-payment system were also far more likely to spend more money when
given the opportunity11.
The demographic specific results, while interesting, were more mixed and
generally less conclusive. The only predictions made in this paper that could reasonably
be supported were those regarding the tendencies for younger participants to spend more
and for higher self-control participants to spend less.
Perhaps the most surprising results of the experimental study were that
differences in annual household income and checking account balance did not cause
significantly different spending choices. This is especially interesting when viewed in
light of the previous research and the Prospect Theory predictions (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979) which would suggest that since low(er)-income participants judge a
windfall against a lower initial reference point they are prone to view the gain as
relatively much larger than wealthier participants. This would lead to predictions for a
greater tendency to consume windfall funds for low(er)-income individuals relative to
high(er)-income individuals.
The experimental results are strengthened by the fact that participants in both
groups had to complete a manipulation check in order to verify that they understood that
their Peer Pay account and their checking account were linked (money in one account
could be easily transferred to the other). Likewise, participants had to perform a second

11

In the case of the experiment in this paper, the scenarios in which participants were able to choose their
own level of expenditure were limited to tipping and donating.
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manipulation check to confirm that the sum of the balances in both accounts (regardless
of windfall location) was equal to the total funds available to them. This second
manipulation check also forced participants to mentally integrate the deposited funds in
the Checking treatment and separate the funds in the Peer Pay treatment.
Despite the apparent strength of the experimental results, it must be noted that this
experiment potentially suffered from the circumstances in which it was conducted. The
global COVID-19 pandemic made it impossible to conduct an experimental study “inperson”. An “in-person” study would have allowed for use of more conventional
experimental methodologies in which participants actually received funds in a peer-topeer system or their checking account. The use of real money would have added
considerable robustness to the study but was not feasible; without the ability to confine
the participants, there was no way to ensure that deposited money would actually be used
for purchases within the experimental parameters and not just “go missing”. Therefore,
the experiment conducted in this paper was limited to the virtual world and relied on a
purely hypothetical windfall and sufficient manipulation checks. Hopefully, postpandemic, this experiment can be adapted and run in the real-world to add robustness.
However, despite this limitation, the results remain statistically significant far beyond
conventional levels.
V:

Conclusion
In this study, I explored a specific aspect of payment mechanism related mental

accounting biases. Building on prior research on other payment mechanisms, I examined
both the presence and scope of mental accounting biases for the emerging field of peerto-peer digital-payment systems. Receiving a windfall via a peer-to-peer digital-payment
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system led to significant increases in participants choosing to make future expenditures
via the peer-to-peer digital-payment mechanism and increases in the consumption of said
windfall.
The increased rate of selection of the peer-to-peer payment mechanism as a result
of windfall location has significant implications for consumers using peer-to-peer digitalpayment systems. These results suggest that consumers using these systems should, at the
very least, be aware of the associated consumption bias. Consumers seeking to accurately
account for their expenditures would be well served to transfer any money received via
these systems out of the systems quickly and systematically. The study results support the
claim that consumers consider money held “in app” is “monopoly money”. This presents
a serious loophole for consumers who are prone to circumventing their own previously
established accounting systems.
These results suggest that sellers and retailers examining the value of adopting or
accepting these systems should choose to, provided the costs of adoption are low. Seller
adoption or acceptance of such systems allows consumers to pay via a mechanism that
lowers their barriers to choosing to consume and stimulates increased spending.
This paper offers strong evidence confirming the presence and scope of mental
accounting biases for peer-to-peer digital-payment systems. It also adds to the
considerable pool of research on the effects of mental accounting for different payment
mechanisms. Prior research has shown that other non-cash, non-check mechanisms (such
as credit and debit cards) increase consumption and spending. The research conducted in
this paper suggests similar, if not greater, effects for peer-to-peer digital-payments.
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With 94 of the 98 participants in this study reporting use of systems such as
Venmo, PayPal, and Zelle, it is clear that peer-to-peer digital-payment systems have
already been broadly adopted and that the mental accounting biases and effects found in
this paper exist despite participant fluency with the systems. A 2020 report from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Caceres-Santamaria 2020) found that 36 percent of
Americans are using peer-to-peer systems. Moreover, 40.4 percent of phone users made
one or more transactions using these systems per month. These usage rates increase in
younger age groups (millennial and younger) with peak usage coming from college-aged
individuals – the exact individuals who offered the anecdotal evidence that motivated the
research in this paper. Peer-to-peer digital-payment systems have already been broadly
adopted and are becoming more and more prominent. Thus, the mental accounting biases
and effects documented in this paper have potent effects on consumer accounting and
spending. As the usage of peer-to-peer digital-payment systems continues to increase,
especially in young adult populations, the consequences of the mental accounting biases
found in this paper will grow in kind.
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Appendix A: Participant Demographic Information
Participant Age
%

Count

18 - 23

0.00%

0

24 - 29

9.18%

9

30 - 39

36.73%

36

40 - 49

27.55%

27

50 - 59

13.27%

13

60 - 69

12.24%

12

70 or Older

1.02%

1

Total

100%

98

Participant Gender
%

Count

Male

53.61%

52

Female

46.39%

45

Non-binary / third gender

0.00%

0

Prefer not to say

0.00%

0

Total

100%

97

Participant Ethnicity
%

Count

78.57%

77

Black or African American

6.12%

6

American Indian or Alaska Native

0.00%

0

12.24%

12

Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander

0.00%

0

Other or Prefer not to say

3.06%

3

Total

100%

98

White

Asian
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Participant Education Level
%

Count

Less than high school

0.00%

0

High school graduate

7.14%

7

Some college

21.43%

21

2 year degree

10.20%

10

4 year degree

47.96%

47

Professional degree

12.24%

12

Doctorate

1.02%

1

Total

100%

98

Participant Annual Household Income
What is your estimated annual household income ($USD)?
Minimum

4000.00

Maximum

245000.00

Mean

62284.67

Std Deviation

38868.75

Participant Checking Account Balance
What is your best estimate of the balance ($USD) in your primary checking
account?
Minimum

100.00

Maximum

150000.00

Mean

9015.57

Std
Deviation

19458.06
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Participant Perceived Self-Control
%

Count

Extremely good

21.43%

21

Somewhat good

59.18%

58

9.18%

9

Somewhat bad

10.20%

10

Extremely bad

0.00%

0

Total

100%

98

Neither good nor bad

Participant Prior Venmo or PayPal Use
%

Count

Yes

95.92%

94

No

4.08%

4

Total

100%

98

Participant Venmo or PayPal Use Frequency
%

Count

2.13%

2

Weekly

27.66%

26

Monthly

52.13%

49

Yearly

18.09%

17

100%

94

Daily

Total
Participant Venmo or PayPal Habits

%

Count

Use money received to make payments through the system

12.77%

12

Transfer money received to the linked bank account

63.83%

60

Keep money received in the system

10.64%

10

It depends or I do not know

12.77%

12

100%

94

Total
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Appendix B: Peer Pay Treatment Experimental Instrument
Intro and Informed Consent

Thank you for participating in my research project. This project is designed to study how
participants make consumption choices when using peer-to-peer digital-payment systems.

Informed Consent
This experiment is being conducted by Jason Saltzman as part of a Senior Thesis project
for Claremont McKenna College.
You may participate in this study if you are 18 years or older.
This study examines how people make decisions about consumption, spending, and
saving.
This study will take 10-15 minutes to participate.
In this experiment you will provide biographic and demographic information before
answering a series of questions about your preferences for making standard purchases. You
will be given a set of instructions regarding your available resources prior to answering
these questions. Responses for each question will be recorded. Following the end of the
survey, you will be debriefed and those who complete the experiment will be compensated
$2.50 for your time.
Participants will be compensated via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Participation is voluntary and you can stop participation at any time without penalty.
All data collected in this study will be held confidentially and will not be shared outside
of the research team members.
Any collected identifiable information will not be used, disclosed, or shared outside of
this experiment.
If needed, you may contact:
Jason Saltzman
Email: jsaltzman20@cmc.edu
Department: CMC (Economics)
CMC IRB contact information (irb@cmc.edu).

I Consent

I Do Not Consent
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Demographic Qs

You will now be asked to answer some demographic questions. Please answer as truthfully
and accurately as possible.

What is your age?
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

18 - 23
24 – 29
30 - 39
40 - 49
50 – 59
60 - 69
70 or Older

With which gender do you identify?
Male
Female
Non-binary / third gender
Prefer not to say

What is your ethnicity?
White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other or Prefer not to say
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What is the highest level of education you have achieved?
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
2 year degree
4 year degree
Professional degree
Doctorate

What is your estimated annual household income ($USD)?

What is your best estimate of the balance ($USD) in your primary checking account?

Please rate your own perceived self-control.
Extremely good
Somewhat good
Neither good nor bad
Somewhat bad
Extremely bad

Have you ever used a peer-to-peer digital-payment system such as PayPal or Venmo before?
Yes
No
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How frequently do you use peer-to-peer digital-payment systems?
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Yearly

If you use peer-to-peer digital-payment systems, do you keep money received in the system or
do you transfer it to an outside bank account?
Keep money received in the system
Use money received to make payments through the system
Transfer money received to the linked bank account
It depends or I do not know

You have completed the demographic portion of this survey. Thank you.
Next, you will be given some basic information about the function of peer-to-peer digitalpayment systems.
Please proceed to the next portion of the study.

Peer Pay Info

Peer-to-peer digital-payment systems (such as Venmo, PayPal, and Zelle) can be used to make
a broad range of transactions. Potential transactions include anything from splitting a dinner
bill between friends to paying your rent to purchasing goods and services with participating
businesses.
Online or mobile applications allow the transfer of funds between two parties using an
individual's linked banking accounts. Many applications keep the money stored within the app
until the user manually transfers the money into a personal banking account or uses their
existing balance to make future payments.
The peer-to-peer digital payment system being used for this study is called Peer Pay.
For the purpose of this study, please assume that peer-to-peer digital-payment transactions and
bank transfers from Peer Pay can be made instantaneously and without added costs or fees.
Peer Pay allows you to make payments from your in-app balance, with any extra money
required to complete a payment taken from the bank account linked to the app.
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Please check all of the following that are TRUE about the peer-to-peer digital-payment system
in this study.
Can be used to make payments or receive money
Are linked to a bank account
Money received is held in app and this balance can be used for future payments OR transferred to a bank
account
There is no delay or added costs or fees associated with a transaction or transfer
Any payment made that exceeds your in-app balance is supplemented with money from the linked bank
account

Now that you understand the function of peer-to-peer digital-payment systems, you will be
given specific information about the resources that are available to you in this portion of the
study. You will then be asked to make a series of decisions regarding payments, purchases,
and expenditures.
Please proceed to the next page.

Peer Pay Treatment

You have just been sent $375 via Peer Pay. $375 is now being held within your Peer Pay InApp balance. Any payments made via Peer Pay in excess of this amount will require money to
be taken from the linked checking account.
Assume that you have current access to the balance of your checking account(s) that you
disclosed when answering the demographic questions. This checking account is the account
that is linked to your Peer Pay account. Assume that you can pay funds from the checking
account whenever you want: you can access these funds by paying with a bank card,
withdrawing cash, writing a check, or via Peer Pay.
Assume that you do not have any cash available.
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Now that you have been sent $375 via Peer Pay, what is the current balance of money
available to you in the following scenarios in:
Your Peer Pay In-App Balance ($USD)
Your Linked Checking Account ($USD)

Please choose a payment option for each of the following scenarios.

You go out to dinner with a friend and agree to split the bill evenly prior to ordering. The bill
total comes out to $65. Your friend puts down their card to pay the bill and gives you the
following options to pay your half. Please choose a method for paying your friend.
Pay with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Pay your friend using Peer Pay

This month's rent is due to your landlord. You owe $350. You are given the following options
to pay your rent. Please choose a method for paying your rent.
Pay with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Pay using Peer Pay

This month's rent is due to your landlord. You owe $400. You are given the following options
to pay your rent. Please choose a method for paying your rent.
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Pay with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)

Pay using Peer Pay

You decide that you need a haircut. You go to your favorite barber or hairdresser. Your barber
or hairdresser asks you how you would like to pay for your $20 haircut and gives you the
following options. Please choose a method for paying for your haircut.
Pay with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Pay using Peer Pay

Would you like to tip your barber or hairdresser?
If yes, please enter the tip amount below. If no, please enter 0.
The tip amount will be added to the amount charged to your selected payment method.

You are walking down the street and pass by a small street market. You stop and look at a few
of the stalls out of curiosity. You find a vendor selling a shirt that you like but weren't
planning on buying before you stopped. You ask the vendor how much the shirt costs and they
tell you that it is $15 if you pay in cash and $16 if you pay via Peer Pay.
Pay $16 with Peer Pay
Pay $15 with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Do not buy the shirt

You normally buy a $10 bottle of wine every week at the grocery store. Today, on the way to
do your weekly shopping, you decide to walk through the local farmer's market. An artisinal
vendor is selling a nice $25 bottle of wine. You have the following options.
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Pay the vendor $25 via Peer Pay
Pay the vendor $25 with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Do not buy the farmer's market wine and carry on to buy your standard $10 bottle at the grocery store

A friend is telling you about a charity they recently heard about that works to end child
hunger. After talking with your friend you decide to visit the charity's website to do some
research of your own. After doing your research you are considering donating to the charity
and look at the options for making a donation. There are two options for donation. You can
either donate via a credit card or via Peer Pay. Please choose an option for donation.
Donate with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Donate with Peer Pay
Do not donate
Please enter an amount that you would like to donate via your chosen method.

You have now completed the study. Thank you for participating. Please proceed to the next
page to be debriefed.

Debrief

1) Thank you for taking the time and effort to participate in this study.
2) Please do not discuss the study or your experiences with others outside of the Investigators
and the IRB, since otherwise you could be affecting the responses of potential participants.
3) This study explores consumption habits and preferences of consumers using peer-to-peer
digital-payment systems.
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4) In this experiment you provided biographic and demographic information before
answering a set of survey questions about hypothetical consumption scenarios. You were
given a description of your available resources and made consumption choices according
to your own preferences in the scenario. As with most consumption choices, you had
multiple options and were able to choose the one you deemed most appropriate. Responses
for each choice were recorded. Following the end of the game, you were debriefed and
compensated $2.50 for your time.
5) If needed, please contact:
Jason Saltzman
Email:
jsaltzman20@cmc.edu
Department: CMC
(Economics) CMC IRB
contact information
(irb@cmc.edu).

Thank you again for your participation in this study.
Please click the "next button" and end the study.

Appendix C: Checking Treatment Experimental Instrument
Intro and Informed Consent

Thank you for participating in my research project. This project is designed to study how
participants make consumption choices when using peer-to-peer digital-payment systems.

Informed Consent
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This experiment is being conducted by Jason Saltzman as part of a Senior Thesis project
for Claremont McKenna College.
You may participate in this study if you are 18 years or older.
This study examines how people make decisions about consumption, spending, and
saving.
This study will take 10-15 minutes to participate.
In this experiment you will provide biographic and demographic information before
answering a series of questions about your preferences for making standard purchases. You
will be given a set of instructions regarding your available resources prior to answering
these questions. Responses for each question will be recorded. Following the end of the
survey, you will be debriefed and those who complete the experiment will be compensated
$2.50 for your time.
Participants will be compensated via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Participation is voluntary and you can stop participation at any time without penalty.
All data collected in this study will be held confidentially and will not be shared outside
of the research team members.
Any collected identifiable information will not be used, disclosed, or shared outside of
this experiment.
If needed, you may contact:
Jason Saltzman
Email: jsaltzman20@cmc.edu
Department: CMC (Economics)
CMC IRB contact information (irb@cmc.edu).

I Consent

I Do Not Consent

Demographic Qs

You will now be asked to answer some demographic questions. Please answer as truthfully
and accurately as possible.

What is your age?
o
o
o

18 - 23
24 – 29
30 - 39
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o
o
o
o

40 - 49
50 – 59
60 - 69
70 or Older

With which gender do you identify?
Male
Female
Non-binary / third gender
Prefer not to say

What is your ethnicity?
White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other or Prefer not to say

What is the highest level of education you have achieved?
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
2 year degree
4 year degree
Professional degree
Doctorate
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What is your estimated annual household income ($USD)?

What is your best estimate of the balance ($USD) in your primary checking account?

Please rate your own perceived self-control.

Extremely good
Somewhat good
Neither good nor bad
Somewhat bad
Extremely bad

Have you ever used a peer-to-peer digital-payment system such as PayPal or Venmo before?
Yes
No

How frequently do you use peer-to-peer digital-payment systems?
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Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Yearly

If you use peer-to-peer digital-payment systems, do you keep money received in the system or
do you transfer it to an outside bank account?
Keep money received in the system
Use money received to make payments through the system
Transfer money received to the linked bank account
It depends or I do not know

You have completed the demographic portion of this survey. Thank you.
Next, you will be given some basic information about the function of peer-to-peer digitalpayment systems.
Please proceed to the next portion of the study.

Peer Pay Info

Peer-to-peer digital-payment systems (such as Venmo, PayPal, and Zelle) can be used to make
a broad range of transactions. Potential transactions include anything from splitting a dinner
bill between friends to paying your rent to purchasing goods and services with participating
businesses.
Online or mobile applications allow the transfer of funds between two parties using an
individual's linked banking accounts. Many applications keep the money stored within the app
until the user manually transfers the money into a personal banking account or uses their
existing balance to make future payments.
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The peer-to-peer digital payment system being used for this study is called Peer Pay.
For the purpose of this study, please assume that peer-to-peer digital-payment transactions
and bank transfers from Peer Pay can be made instantaneously and without added costs or
fees. Peer Pay allows you to make payments from your in-app balance, with any extra money
required to complete a payment taken from the bank account linked to the app.

Please check all of the following that are TRUE about the peer-to-peer digital-payment system
in this study.
Can be used to make payments or receive money
Are linked to a bank account
Money received is held in app and this balance can be used for future payments OR transferred to a bank
account
There is no delay or added costs or fees associated with a transaction or transfer
Any payment made that exceeds your in-app balance is supplemented with money from the linked bank
account

Now that you understand the function of peer-to-peer digital-payment systems, you will be
given specific information about the resources that are available to you in this portion of the
study. You will then be asked to make a series of decisions regarding payments, purchases,
and expenditures.
Please proceed to the next page.
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Checking Treatment

$375 has been deposited to your checking account. Assume that you have current access to
this $375 added to the balance of your checking account that you disclosed when answering
the demographic questions. This checking account is the account that is linked to your Peer
Pay account. Assume that you can pay funds from the checking account whenever you want:
you can access these funds by paying with a bank card, withdrawing cash, writing a check, or
via Peer Pay.
Assume that you have no current balance being held within your Peer Pay In-App balance.
Any payments made via Peer Pay will require money to be transferred from the linked
checking account.
Assume that you do not have any cash available.

Now that you have been sent $375 via direct deposit to your checking account, what is the
current balance of money available to you in the following scenarios in:
Your Peer Pay In-App Balance ($USD)
Your Linked Checking Account ($USD)

Please choose a payment option for each of the following scenarios.

You go out to dinner with a friend and agree to split the bill evenly prior to ordering. The bill
total comes out to $65. Your friend puts down their card to pay the bill and gives you the
following options to pay your half. Please choose a method for paying your friend.
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Pay with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Pay your friend using Peer Pay

This month's rent is due to your landlord. You owe $350. You are given the following options
to pay your rent. Please choose a method for paying your rent.
Pay with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Pay using Peer Pay

This month's rent is due to your landlord. You owe $400. You are given the following options
to pay your rent. Please choose a method for paying your rent.
Pay with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)

Pay using Peer Pay

You decide that you need a haircut. You go to your favorite barber or hairdresser. Your barber
or hairdresser asks you how you would like to pay for your $20 haircut and gives you the
following options. Please choose a method for paying for your haircut.
Pay with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Pay using Peer Pay

Would you like to tip your barber or hairdresser?
If yes, please enter the tip amount below. If no, please enter 0.
The tip amount will be added to the amount charged to your selected payment method.
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You are walking down the street and pass by a small street market. You stop and look at a few
of the stalls out of curiosity. You find a vendor selling a shirt that you like but weren't
planning on buying before you stopped. You ask the vendor how much the shirt costs and
they tell you that it is $15 if you pay in cash and $16 if you pay via Peer Pay.
Pay $16 with Peer Pay
Pay $15 with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Do not buy the shirt

You normally buy a $10 bottle of wine every week at the grocery store. Today, on the way to
do your weekly shopping, you decide to walk through the local farmer's market. An artisinal
vendor is selling a nice $25 bottle of wine. You have the following options.
Pay the vendor $25 via Peer Pay
Pay the vendor $25 with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Do not buy the farmer's market wine and carry on to buy your standard $10 bottle at the grocery store

A friend is telling you about a charity they recently heard about for that works to end child
hunger. After talking with your friend you decide to visit the charity's website to do some
research of your own. After doing your research you are considering donating to the charity
and look at the options for making a donation. There are two options for donation. You can
either donate via a credit card or via Peer Pay. Please choose an option for donation.
Donate with checking account (bank card, withdrawn cash, or check)
Donate with Peer Pay
Do not donate

Please enter an amount that you would like to donate via your chosen method.

74

You have now completed the study. Thank you for participating. Please proceed to the next
page to be debriefed.

Debrief

1) Thank you for taking the time and effort to participate in this study.
2) Please do not discuss the study or your experiences with others outside of the Investigators
and the IRB, since otherwise you could be affecting the responses of potential participants.
3) This study explores consumption habits and preferences of consumers using peer-to-peer
digital-payment systems.
4) In this experiment you provided biographic and demographic information before
answering a set of survey questions about hypothetical consumption scenarios. You were
given a description of your available resources and made consumption choices according
to your own preferences in the scenario. As with most consumption choices, you had
multiple options and were able to choose the one you deemed most appropriate. Responses
for each choice were recorded. Following the end of the game, you were debriefed and
compensated $2.50 for your time.
5) If needed, please contact:
Jason Saltzman
Email:
jsaltzman20@cmc.edu
Department: CMC
(Economics) CMC IRB
contact information
(irb@cmc.edu).

Thank you again for your participation in this study.
Please click the "next button" and end the study.
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Graph 1

Dinner Payment By Treatment

Choice (% Participants)

Pay with checking account
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

Pay your friend using Peer Pay
77.6%

55.1%
44.9%
22.4%

Checking

Peer Pay

Treatment

Notes:
p-value = .009 for test of differences between % participants choosing payment method
by treatment (Checking versus Peer Pay)
49 participants/observations per treatment
Graph 2

$350 Rent By Treatment
Pay with checking account

Choice (% Participants)

100.0%

Pay using Peer Pay

87.8%

80.0%
60.0%

51.0%

49.0%

40.0%
20.0%

12.2%

0.0%
Checking

Peer Pay

Treatment

Notes:
p-value = .000 for test of differences between % participants choosing payment method
by treatment (Checking versus Peer Pay)
49 participants/observations per treatment
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Graph 3

$400 Rent By Treatment
Pay with checking account

Choice (% Participants)

100.0%

Pay using Peer Pay

89.8%

80.0%

69.4%

60.0%
40.0%

30.6%

20.0%

10.2%

0.0%
Checking

Peer Pay

Treatment

Notes:
p-value = .006 for test of differences between % participants choosing payment method
by treatment (Checking versus Peer Pay)
49 participants/observations per treatment
Graph 4

Haircut By Treatment
Pay with checking account

Choice (% Participants)

80.0%

Pay using Peer Pay

73.5%

73.5%

70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%

26.5%

26.5%

20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Checking

Peer Pay

Treatment

Notes:
p-value = .000 for test of differences between % participants choosing payment method
by treatment (Checking versus Peer Pay)
49 participants/observations per treatment
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Graph 5

% Participants

Haircut Tip By Treatment
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
$-

$2.00 $3.00 $4.00 $5.00 $6.00 $7.00 $8.00 $10.0 $20.0
0
0

Checking 8.2%

2.0%

6.1%

8.2% 69.4% 0.0%

2.0%

0.0%

Peer Pay 4.1%

2.0%

0.0% 16.3% 51.0% 4.1%

0.0%

4.1% 18.4% 0.0%

2.0%

2.0%

Tip Amount

Notes:
p-value = .050 for test of differences between average tip amount by treatment (Checking
versus Peer Pay)
Average tip in Checking treatment was $4.78 & Peer Pay treatment was $5.65
45 participants chose to tip a non-$0 amount in the Checking treatment
47 participants chose to tip a non-$0 amount in the Peer Pay treatment
Graph 6

T-Shirt By Treatment
Pay $16 with Peer Pay

Choice (% Participants)

80.0%

Pay $15 with checking account

Do not buy the shirt

67.3%

70.0%
60.0%

49.0%

50.0%

38.8%

40.0%
24.5%

30.0%
20.0%
10.0%

12.2%

8.2%

0.0%
Checking

Peer Pay

Treatment

Notes:
p-value = .252 for test of differences between % participants choosing payment method
by treatment (Checking versus Peer Pay)
49 participants/observations per treatment
37 participants chose to buy the shirt in the Checking treatment
30 participants chose to buy the shirt in the Peer Pay treatment
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Graph 7

Luxury Wine By Treatment
Pay $25 via Peer Pay

Pay $25 with checking account
75.5%

80.0%

Choice (% Participants)

Buy the standard $10 bottle

70.0%

63.3%

60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
24.5%

30.0%
20.0%

14.3%

10.0%

10.2%

12.2%

Checking

Peer Pay

0.0%

Treatment

Notes:
p-value = .101 for test of differences between % participants choosing payment method
by treatment (Checking versus Peer Pay)
49 participants/observations per treatment
12 participants chose to buy the luxury wine in the Checking treatment
18 participants chose to buy the luxury wine in the Peer Pay treatment
Graph 8

Donation Method By Treatment
Donate with checking account

Donate with Peer Pay

Do not donate

Choice (% Participants

60.0%
50.0%

49.0%
42.9%

40.0%
30.0%

28.6%

32.7%

28.6%
18.4%

20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Checking

Peer Pay

Treatment

Notes:
p-value = .004 for test of differences between % participants choosing payment method
by treatment (Checking versus Peer Pay)
49 participants/observations per treatment
35 participants chose to donate in the Checking treatment
33 participants chose to donate in the Peer Pay treatment
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Graph 9

Donation Amount By Treatment
35.0%

% Participants

30.0%
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%

$1

$3

$5

$8

$9

$10

$15

$20

$25

$50

$100

Checking 2.0% 2.0% 8.2% 2.0% 2.0% 30.6% 4.1% 14.3% 6.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Peer Pay 2.0% 0.0% 4.1% 2.0% 0.0% 22.4% 0.0% 14.3% 4.1% 12.2% 6.1%

Donation Amount

Notes:
p-value = .004 for test of differences between average donation amount by treatment
(Checking versus Peer Pay)
Average tip in Checking treatment was $12.46 & Peer Pay treatment was $27.85
35 participants chose to donate in the Checking treatment
33 participants chose to donate in the Peer Pay treatment
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Table 1
Age

29 & under
Checking

Dinner Split

Pay with checking account
Pay your friend using Peer Pay

$350 Rent

Peer Pay

30 & over
Checking

Peer Pay

75.0%
25.0%

20.0%
80.0%

42.2%
57.8%

22.7%
77.3%

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

100.0%
0.0%

60.0%
40.0%

86.7%
13.3%

50.0%
50.0%

$400 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

75.0%
25.0%

60.0%
40.0%

91.1%
8.9%

70.5%
29.5%

Haircut

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

75.0%
25.0%

40.0%
60.0%

73.3%
26.7%

25.0%
75.0%

Haircut Tip

Average

$

4.75

$

5.80

$

4.78

$

5.64

Pay $16 with Peer Pay
Pay $15 with checking account
Do not buy the shirt

0.0%
75.0%
25.0%

40.0%
20.0%
40.0%

8.9%
66.7%
24.4%

9.1%
52.3%
38.6%

Pay the vendor $25 via Peer Pay
Pay the vendor $25 with checking account
Buy your standard $10 bottle at the grocery store

0.0%
25.0%
75.0%

20.0%
20.0%
60.0%

15.6%
8.9%
75.6%

25.0%
11.4%
63.6%

Donation Choice

Donate with checking account
Donate with Peer Pay
Do not donate

25.0%
50.0%
25.0%

0.0%
80.0%
20.0%

44.4%
26.7%
28.9%

20.5%
45.5%
34.1%

Donation Amount

Average

T-Shirt Premium

Luxury Wine

$
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12.00

$

60.00

$

12.50

$

23.41

Table 2
Education Level

< 4yr Degree

≥ 4yr Degree

Dinner Split

Pay with checking account
Pay your friend using Peer Pay

46.7%
53.3%

26.1%
73.9%

44.1%
55.9%

19.2%
80.8%

$350 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

86.7%
13.3%

47.8%
52.2%

88.2%
11.8%

53.8%
46.2%

$400 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

100.0%
0.0%

60.9%
39.1%

85.3%
14.7%

76.9%
23.1%

Haircut

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

66.7%
33.3%

34.8%
65.2%

76.5%
23.5%

19.2%
80.8%

Haircut Tip

Average

$

4.67

$

5.70

$

4.82

$

5.62

Pay $16 with Peer Pay
Pay $15 with checking account
Do not buy the shirt

6.7%
53.3%
40.0%

13.0%
43.5%
43.5%

8.8%
73.5%
17.6%

11.5%
53.8%
34.6%

Pay the vendor $25 via Peer Pay
Pay the vendor $25 with checking account
Buy your standard $10 bottle at the grocery store

6.7%
0.0%
93.3%

26.1%
13.0%
60.9%

17.6%
14.7%
67.6%

23.1%
11.5%
65.4%

Donation Choice

Donate with checking account
Donate with Peer Pay
Do not donate

33.3%
46.7%
20.0%

13.0%
60.9%
26.1%

47.1%
20.6%
32.4%

23.1%
38.5%
38.5%

Donation Amount

Average

T-Shirt Premium

Luxury Wine

$

82

11.92

$

28.12

$

12.74

$

27.56

Table 3
Annual Household Income ($USD)

≤ 40000
Checking

Peer Pay

40001 - 80000
Checking
Peer Pay

80001 - 120000
Checking
Peer Pay

120001 - 160000
Checking
Peer Pay

≥ 160001
Checking

Peer Pay

Dinner Split

Pay with checking account
Pay your friend using Peer Pay

$350 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

100.0%
0.0%

36.4%
63.6%

77.3%
22.7%

61.1%
38.9%

87.5%
12.5%

60.0%
40.0%

100.0%
0.0%

66.7%
33.3%

100.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%

$400 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

100.0%
0.0%

59.1%
40.9%

81.8%
18.2%

72.2%
27.8%

87.5%
12.5%

100.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%

66.7%
33.3%

100.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%

Haircut

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

81.3%
18.8%

22.7%
77.3%

63.6%
36.4%

38.9%
61.1%

87.5%
12.5%

0.0%
100.0%

100.0%
0.0%

33.3%
66.7%

0.0%
100.0%

0.0%
100.0%

Haircut Tip

Average

$

56.3%
43.8%

18.2%
81.8%

50.0%
50.0%

33.3%
66.7%

25.0%
75.0%

0.0%
100.0%

0.0%
100.0%

33.3%
66.7%

0.0%
100.0%

0.0%
100.0%

4.06

$

5.32

$

5.36

$

5.39

$

4.63

$

8.00

$

4.50

$

5.67

$

5.00

$

6.00

Pay $16 with Peer Pay
Pay $15 with checking account
Do not buy the shirt

6.3%
62.5%
31.3%

13.6%
50.0%
36.4%

9.1%
68.2%
22.7%

11.1%
44.4%
44.4%

12.5%
62.5%
25.0%

20.0%
40.0%
40.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

0.0%
66.7%
33.3%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

Pay the vendor $25 via Peer Pay
Pay the vendor $25 with checking account
Buy your standard $10 bottle at the grocery store

6.3%
0.0%
93.8%

22.7%
4.5%
72.7%

18.2%
13.6%
68.2%

22.2%
11.1%
66.7%

12.5%
25.0%
62.5%

20.0%
40.0%
40.0%

0.0%
0.0%
100.0%

33.3%
33.3%
33.3%

100.0%
0.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Donation Choice

Donate with checking account
Donate with Peer Pay
Do not donate

31.3%
18.8%
50.0%

22.7%
40.9%
36.4%

40.9%
45.5%
13.6%

16.7%
61.1%
22.2%

50.0%
12.5%
37.5%

0.0%
60.0%
40.0%

100.0%
0.0%
0.0%

33.3%
0.0%
66.7%

100.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

Donation Amount

Average

T-Shirt Premium

Luxury Wine

$

13.13

$

22.93

$

12.00

$

36.79

$

8.60

$

7.67

$

20.00

$

10.00

$

20.00

$

50.00

Table 4
Perceived Self-Control Level

Extremely good

Somewhat good

Neither good nor bad

Somewhat bad

Dinner Split

Pay with checking account
Pay your friend using Peer Pay

50.0%
50.0%

44.4%
55.6%

42.9%
57.1%

16.7%
83.3%

42.9%
57.1%

50.0%
50.0%

50.0%
50.0%

12.5%
87.5%

$350 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

91.7%
8.3%

100.0%
0.0%

85.7%
14.3%

50.0%
50.0%

100.0%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%

50.0%
50.0%

12.5%
87.5%

$400 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

100.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%

85.7%
14.3%

70.0%
30.0%

100.0%
0.0%

50.0%
50.0%

50.0%
50.0%

37.5%
62.5%

Haircut

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

75.0%
25.0%

44.4%
55.6%

71.4%
28.6%

23.3%
76.7%

85.7%
14.3%

50.0%
50.0%

50.0%
50.0%

12.5%
87.5%

Haircut Tip

Average

$

4.92

$

5.00

$

4.86

$

5.53

$

4.57

$

4.50

$

3.50

$

7.13

Pay $16 with Peer Pay
Pay $15 with checking account
Do not buy the shirt

8.3%
83.3%
8.3%

22.2%
33.3%
44.4%

7.1%
60.7%
32.1%

6.7%
53.3%
40.0%

14.3%
57.1%
28.6%

0.0%
50.0%
50.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

25.0%
50.0%
25.0%

Pay the vendor $25 via Peer Pay
Pay the vendor $25 with checking account
Buy your standard $10 bottle at the grocery store

16.7%
16.7%
66.7%

22.2%
22.2%
55.6%

14.3%
7.1%
78.6%

26.7%
13.3%
60.0%

0.0%
14.3%
85.7%

0.0%
0.0%
100.0%

50.0%
0.0%
50.0%

25.0%
0.0%
75.0%

Donation Choice

Donate with checking account
Donate with Peer Pay
Do not donate

33.3%
33.3%
33.3%

55.6%
22.2%
22.2%

46.4%
28.6%
25.0%

13.3%
53.3%
33.3%

42.9%
14.3%
42.9%

0.0%
0.0%
100.0%

50.0%
50.0%
0.0%

0.0%
75.0%
25.0%

Donation Amount

Average

T-Shirt Premium

Luxury Wine

$

83

11.63

$

26.86

$

13.43

$

27.75

$

7.75

$

15.00

$

29.33

Table 5
Primary Checking Account Balance ($USD)

≤ 1000
Checking

1001 - 5000
Checking
Peer Pay

Peer Pay

5001 - 20000
Checking
Peer Pay

≥ 20001
Checking

Peer Pay

Dinner Split

Pay with checking account
Pay your friend using Peer Pay

45.5%
54.5%

50.0%
50.0%

43.8%
56.3%

0.0%
100.0%

42.1%
57.9%

10.0%
90.0%

66.7%
33.3%

20.0%
80.0%

$350 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

81.8%
18.2%

33.3%
66.7%

93.8%
6.3%

56.3%
43.8%

84.2%
15.8%

60.0%
40.0%

100.0%
0.0%

80.0%
20.0%

$400 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

90.9%
9.1%

61.1%
38.9%

93.8%
6.3%

75.0%
25.0%

84.2%
15.8%

60.0%
40.0%

100.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%

Haircut

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

45.5%
54.5%

50.0%
50.0%

81.3%
18.8%

6.3%
93.8%

78.9%
21.1%

30.0%
70.0%

100.0%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%

Haircut Tip

Average

$

3.45

$

4.94

$

5.81

$

5.31

$

4.68

$

6.70

$

4.67

$

7.20

Pay $16 with Peer Pay
Pay $15 with checking account
Do not buy the shirt

9.1%
45.5%
45.5%

16.7%
38.9%
44.4%

6.3%
68.8%
25.0%

18.8%
62.5%
18.8%

10.5%
78.9%
10.5%

0.0%
60.0%
40.0%

0.0%
66.7%
33.3%

0.0%
20.0%
80.0%

Pay the vendor $25 via Peer Pay
Pay the vendor $25 with checking account
Buy your standard $10 bottle at the grocery store

9.1%
9.1%
81.8%

16.7%
16.7%
66.7%

6.3%
6.3%
87.5%

37.5%
0.0%
62.5%

21.1%
10.5%
68.4%

10.0%
20.0%
70.0%

33.3%
33.3%
33.3%

40.0%
20.0%
40.0%

Donation Choice

Donate with checking account
Donate with Peer Pay
Do not donate

18.2%
45.5%
36.4%

27.8%
44.4%
27.8%

50.0%
18.8%
31.3%

12.5%
62.5%
25.0%

47.4%
31.6%
21.1%

20.0%
50.0%
30.0%

66.7%
0.0%
33.3%

0.0%
20.0%
80.0%

Donation Amount

Average

T-Shirt Premium

Luxury Wine

$

9.43

$

16.15

$

13.18

$

22.58

$

13.67

$

55.43

$

10.00

$

50.00

Table 6
Ethnicity

White
Checking

Peer Pay

Black or African American
Checking
Peer Pay

Asian
Checking

Peer Pay

Other or Prefer not to say
Checking
Peer Pay

Dinner Split

Pay with checking account
Pay your friend using Peer Pay

50.0%
50.0%

20.5%
79.5%

0.0%
100.0%

50.0%
50.0%

28.6%
71.4%

0.0%
100.0%

50.0%
50.0%

100.0%
0.0%

$350 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

89.5%
10.5%

53.8%
46.2%

100.0%
0.0%

50.0%
50.0%

71.4%
28.6%

40.0%
60.0%

100.0%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%

$400 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

92.1%
7.9%

69.2%
30.8%

100.0%
0.0%

75.0%
25.0%

71.4%
28.6%

80.0%
20.0%

100.0%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%

Haircut

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

76.3%
23.7%

30.8%
69.2%

50.0%
50.0%

0.0%
100.0%

71.4%
28.6%

0.0%
100.0%

50.0%
50.0%

100.0%
0.0%

Haircut Tip

Average

$

4.82

$

5.51

$

5.00

$

6.75

$

4.43

$

6.00

$

5.00

$

5.00

Pay $16 with Peer Pay
Pay $15 with checking account
Do not buy the shirt

7.9%
65.8%
26.3%

15.4%
46.2%
38.5%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

0.0%
50.0%
50.0%

14.3%
71.4%
14.3%

0.0%
60.0%
40.0%

0.0%
50.0%
50.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

Pay the vendor $25 via Peer Pay
Pay the vendor $25 with checking account
Buy your standard $10 bottle at the grocery store

10.5%
7.9%
81.6%

28.2%
10.3%
61.5%

0.0%
0.0%
100.0%

25.0%
25.0%
50.0%

28.6%
28.6%
42.9%

0.0%
20.0%
80.0%

50.0%
0.0%
50.0%

0.0%
0.0%
100.0%

Donation Choice

Donate with checking account
Donate with Peer Pay
Do not donate

42.1%
26.3%
31.6%

23.1%
43.6%
33.3%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

0.0%
75.0%
25.0%

57.1%
14.3%
28.6%

0.0%
60.0%
40.0%

50.0%
50.0%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

Donation Amount

Average

T-Shirt Premium

Luxury Wine

$

13.69

84

$

31.00

$

9.00

$

21.00

$

6.40

$

13.33

$

15.00

$

10.00

Table 7
Gender

Male
Checking

Peer Pay

Female
Checking

Peer Pay

Dinner Split

Pay with checking account
Pay your friend using Peer Pay

51.7%
48.3%

21.7%
78.3%

36.8%
63.2%

23.1%
76.9%

$350 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

89.7%
10.3%

43.5%
56.5%

84.2%
15.8%

57.7%
42.3%

$400 Rent

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

89.7%
10.3%

60.9%
39.1%

89.5%
10.5%

76.9%
23.1%

Haircut

Pay with checking account
Pay using Peer Pay

75.9%
24.1%

26.1%
73.9%

73.7%
26.3%

26.9%
73.1%

Haircut Tip

Average

$

4.24

$

5.74

$

5.58

$

5.58

Pay $16 with Peer Pay
Pay $15 with checking account
Do not buy the shirt

6.9%
65.5%
27.6%

13.0%
52.2%
34.8%

10.5%
68.4%
21.1%

11.5%
46.2%
42.3%

Pay the vendor $25 via Peer Pay
Pay the vendor $25 with checking account
Buy your standard $10 bottle at the grocery store

13.8%
6.9%
79.3%

17.4%
4.3%
78.3%

15.8%
15.8%
68.4%

30.8%
19.2%
50.0%

Donation Choice

Donate with checking account
Donate with Peer Pay
Do not donate

44.8%
24.1%
31.0%

13.0%
39.1%
47.8%

42.1%
31.6%
26.3%

23.1%
57.7%
19.2%

Donation Amount

Average

T-Shirt Premium

Luxury Wine

$

85

12.20

$

25.92

$

13.07

$

28.95

